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The Automatic and Controlled Influence of Environmental Cues During Recognition Judgments
by
Diana Selmeczy
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2014
Professor Ian G. Dobbins, Chairperson
Recognition judgments are often made in the context of environmental information, such
as instructions or payout regimens that observers have been shown to use in order to adaptively
bias their memory judgments. These adaptive biases are usually characterized as a strategic,
controlled process that observers adopt intentionally, and this is formalized in signal detection
theory wherein strategic criterion placement is assumed fully independent of recognition
evidence signals. However, recent pilot research in our laboratory suggests that the ability to
regulate recognition decision biases in the context of environmental cues may not be fully
controlled by observers suggesting an automatic or unintentional cue influence operating during
recognition judgment. The current set of experiments examined the degree to which observers
could disregard environmental cues during their recognition decisions and is the first systematic
study of the ability of observers to disregard non-mnemonic cues during recognition decisions.
As a whole, they suggest that observers cannot fully isolate their own memorial processes from
cue-induced expectations or confirmations, which in turn suggests there is a lower limit to the
degree to which decision biases are under strategic control.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The ability of observers to identify whether or not a stimulus originated from a specific
previous experience is termed recognition memory. The decision processes underlying
recognition have been of great theoretical interest for many decades and in particular researchers
have been keenly interested in the degree to which observers can strategically alter their decision
processes to maximize accuracy or goals such as expected gains in various contexts (e.g.,
differing locations, times of day, etc.). For example, deciding whether an individual is
recognized should be influenced by our surroundings such that a positive judgment should
require less memory evidence at a department meeting, where most people tend to be familiar,
than at a foreign airport, where one is a priori unlikely to encounter a familiar individual.
Strategically biasing judgments is a form of Bayesian reasoning such that an individual judges
current evidence in light of prior probabilities or base-rates of oldness or newness. If the prior
highly favors oldness then minimal evidence is required for an old judgment, if it instead favors
newness then considerable positive evidence should be required for the same judgment. The
current proposal examines the degree to which observers can control these types of adaptive
memory biases when explicit environmental cues indicate the prior probability that a given
stimulus is old or new.
Ideal observer models assume that observers have full control of adaptive memory biases
and intentionally change their decision strategies under varying contexts. In fact, research
demonstrates that participants can change their responses by simply being instructed to do so
(Healy & Jones, 1975; Hirshman, 1995; Miller, Handy, Cutler, Inati, & Wolford, 2001),
suggesting that the decision process can be volitionally manipulated. However, closer
examination of the literature suggests that observers may require a great deal of external support
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to alter decision strategies. The current proposal will explore the degree to which observers are
able to strategically alter their decision biases as a function of context and, critically, the
potential role of automatic mechanisms during this process. In other words, I will test the
possibility that observers may not be able to fully control the biasing process or processes.
I will begin by outlining a common, formal decision model of recognition and
summarizing prior research examining explicit factors that influence the decision process. I will
draw general conclusions regarding when decisions are likely to be strategically altered and the
degree to which this process is explicitly controlled by observers. I will then explore the putative
role of automatic influences on memory decision processes and the rationale for the current
series of experiments.

1.1 Signal Detection Theory
Recognition decision making has been studied extensively and can be more formally
described using the theory of signal detection (Banks, 1970; Egan, 1958; Parks, 1966). Signal
detection theory serves as a foundation for many models of recognition memory and I will focus
on the simplest form of the model (i.e., one dimensional equal-variance model). In the laboratory,
participants study a list of items and then complete a recognition test during which they indicate
whether intermixed studied and novel items arise from the study context (‘old’) or are new to the
experiment (‘new’). The signal detection model represents old and new items with overlapping
normal distributions on a continuous axis of familiarity or memory evidence (Figure 1). The
mean of the old item distribution falls to the right of the new item distribution due to the recent
exposure of old items during study. Since the item distributions overlap, observers are forced to
parse continuous memory evidence into one of the two discrete response categories: old or new.
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This results in four possible response types termed a hit (old item correctly classified as ‘old’),
miss (old item incorrectly classified as ‘new’), correct rejection (new item correctly classified as
‘new’), and false alarm (new item incorrectly classified as ‘old’). The level of evidence where an
observer classifies items falling above the value as old and below the value as new is referred to
as a decision criterion and biased judgment reflects the positioning of the criterion so as to
generally favor either ‘old’ or ‘new’ classification responses.
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Figure 1. Basic Signal Detection Model. The figure above represents the equal-variance
signal detection model. The x-axis is strength of evidence, the distribution to the right is
previously studied old items, and the distribution to the left is new items. The decision
criterion reflects the point at which observers parse the continuous memory evidence axis
into items they report as “Old” vs. “New”. This results in four possible response types
termed a hit (old item correctly classified as ‘old’), miss (old item incorrectly classified as
‘new’), correct rejection (new item correctly classified as ‘new’), and false alarm (new item
incorrectly classified as ‘old’).
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Early and many current models assume that observers strategically place their response
criterion in such a way as to maximize the proportion of correct responding (Glanzer, Hilford, &
Maloney, 2009; Pastore, Crawley, Berens, & Skelly, 2003; Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961;
Turner, Van Zandt, & Brown, 2011). This ability implies that for every experienced strength
value, the observer estimates the probability of it having arisen from the old item distribution vs.
the new item distribution. The ideal observer classifies the stimulus by labeling it as originating
from the distribution yielding the highest probability, which can be simply formalized as a
likelihood ratio decision variable consisting of target divided by lure probability estimates.
When this ratio is greater than one, the item is labeled as a target and when it is below one it is
labeled as a lure. As seen in Figure 1, the prior probability of old and new items is equal where
the distributions overlap and this strength value has a likelihood ratio of 1. This is the only point
on the axis during which the observer would be indifferent as to which label was assigned to the
stimulus. Hence under this approach, the decision variable is not raw strength but one of
likelihood ratios or odds in favor (or against) oldness. Aside from the benefit of being
statistically optimal, assuming that observers use such an axis reduces all dichotomous
discriminations to a common metric, namely relative likelihoods.
Under signal detection theory, recognition accuracy is measured using the d’ (d-prime)
statistic, which estimates the distance between the two internal evidence distribution means in
common standard deviation units. Thus, a greater difference between distribution means is
associated with greater internal sensitivity or a larger d’. Internal sensitivity within a given
context is assumed fixed such that the observer cannot will a greater sensitivity under a particular
set of conditions. Analogously, one might deeply wish to be able to see the smallest line of
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letters during a vision test, but this will not actually improve the internal resolution of the vision
system.
In contrast to internal sensitivity, the decision bias or recognition criterion can be altered
such that by changing the criterion location one can favor particular judgments in different
contexts. This allows one to potentially maximize outcomes even though the internal sensitivity
remains fixed. For example, one’s internal sensitivity to familiar versus novel faces may be fixed,
but the decision strategy employed when one is at a foreign airport should ideally be different
than when one is at a local department meeting. One common measure used to calculate criterion
is the C statistic, which estimates criterion location relative to the center of the overlap between
the two evidence distributions in standard deviation units. When C equals zero, observers are
said to be ‘unbiased’ and respond ‘old’ and ‘new’ at equal rates with the criterion located at the
intersection of the evidence distributions (Figure 1). Negative C values, commonly referred to as
liberal responding, occurs when participants respond ‘old’ more often, whereas positive C values,
commonly referred to as conservative responding, occur when participants respond ‘new’ more
often.
Aside from differences in priors, there are a host of other environmental conditions or
cues that should lead observers to strategically change their decision criteria and these are
described in more detail in the following section. Furthermore, it is important to note that while
the previous examples focus on maximizing correct responding, in other contexts the goal of the
observer may be to maximize the expected value of judgments (for more information see Lynn &
Barrett, 2014). For example, in some situations the mistake of committing a false alarm may be
particularly more costly than a miss, such as the embarrassment of mistakenly approaching a
stranger as familiar as opposed to not greeting a friend. In this case, the observer more heavily
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weights the avoidance of a particular class of costly errors, and sets a conservative criterion to
avoid committing false alarms and maximize social rewards. Thus, optimal criterion placement
depends on the specific goal in a given context. While often the goal may be to maximize correct
responding, another potential and functionally different goal may be to maximize the expected
value of judgments by placing the criterion to jointly maximize social or economic gains for
correct judgments and minimize costs for errors.

1.2 Factors That Influence Criterion Placement
Researchers examining the adjustment of recognition decisions often use language that
suggests criterion regulation is a wholly strategic or controlled process. For example, criterion
adjustment is described as “difficult or effortful” (p. 256 Verde & Rotello, 2007), requiring
“mental energy” (p. 1390 Stretch & Wixted, 1998b), and as a “controlled executive processes”
(p. 1186 Dobbins & Kroll, 2005). It is not necessarily surprising that criterion regulation is
thought to be a strategic process, since appropriate criterion placement may require observers to
reflect on prior encoding experiences (e.g., well learned vs. poorly studied items), consider
rewards or penalties for certain response types, and/or consider the relative preponderance of
familiar versus novel items in the environment. Additionally, certain contexts may require
observers to use multiple decision strategies such that some items should elicit the use of a
conservative criterion while other items should elicit the use of a liberal criterion. Most often it is
this ability to maintain multiple criteria simultaneously and adaptively switch between them that
is described as being particularly effortful and demanding (Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009;
Benjamin, Tullis, & Lee, 2013; Morrell, Gaitan, & Wixted, 2002; Stretch & Wixted, 1998b).
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The most basic demonstration of volitional criterion control involves simply asking
participants to try to avoid particular types of judgment errors (Healy & Jones, 1975; Hirshman,
1995; Miller et al., 2001). For example, in Miller et al. (2001) participants were told to respond
liberally (i.e., avoid misses) to words presented in green and conservatively (i.e., avoid false
alarms) to words presented in red during a recognition test. Participants were tested in blocks of
intermixed old/new words, where either all the words were presented in one color signifying
conservative or liberal responding for that block, or colors were intermixed within a block where
some words were presented in green while other words were presented in red. Regardless of
whether word color was fixed or intermixed within a block, participants adopted more liberal
criteria for words presented in green and more conservative criteria for words presented in red.
The fact that participants can change their decision biases through simple instruction suggests
that recognition biases are at least in part under volitional control and hence there may be a wide
array of environmental cues that participants use to purposefully bias their recognition judgments.
In addition to simply asking participants to adopt a particular recognition bias,
participants adopt decision biases in response to various manipulations such as differences in
base rates (Estes & Maddox, 1995; Healy & Kubovy, 1978; Heit, Brockdorff, & Lamberts, 2003;
Kantner & Lindsay, 2010; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Van Zandt, 2000), performance payouts
(Curran, DeBuse, & Leynes, 2007; Healy & Kubovy, 1978; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988; Van
Zandt, 2000), memory strength, (Hirshman, 1995; Singer, 2009; Stretch & Wixted, 1998b), and
item memorability or distinctiveness (Benjamin & Bawa, 2004; Brown, Steyvers, & Hemmer,
2007; Dobbins & Kroll, 2005). For example, in Healy and Kubovy (1978) participants studied
lists of five digit numbers followed by recognition tests with varying ratios of old and new items.
Results revealed that participants adopted more liberal criteria when the majority of test items
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were old (75% old, 25% new) relative to when the majority of test items were new (75% new,
25% old). Thus in line with our earlier home department vs. foreign airport example, it appears
that under some circumstances, observers do factor in statistical priors when making recognition
judgments. In contrast to manipulations of base rates, Hirshman (1995) manipulated average
strength of targets between test lists in order to induce a criterion shift. Participants studied a
purely weak list where all items were presented for 400ms, and a mixed list where half the items
were weak items presented for 400ms, and half were strong items presented for 2 seconds.
Participants used a more conservative criterion for weak items studied in a mixed list context vs.
a pure weak list context, since the average strength of items was higher in a mixed list than a
pure weak list. Note that the specific experiments described above used between list
manipulations that require observers to maintain a single criterion across one test list and adopt a
different criterion across another separate test list.
Criterion placement can also be influenced by using a within list or trial-by-trial
manipulation. One example of such a manipulation uses an Explicit Memory Cueing paradigm
where participants are provided with reliable external cues indicating the likely status of each
upcoming memory probe. Under such situations, an ideal observer should incorporate these cues
along with their internal memory evidence before rendering a judgment. In other words,
observers should adaptively bias their response in accordance with the environmental cue (i.e.
Likely Old or Likely New) on a trial-by-trial basis in order to maximize overall performance (for
more detail please see Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). A growing number of studies from our
laboratory assess the influence of reliable external recommendations during recognition
decisions (Jaeger, Cox, & Dobbins, 2012a; Jaeger, Lauris, Selmeczy, & Dobbins, 2012b;
O'Connor, Han, & Dobbins, 2010). For example, in Selmeczy and Dobbins (2013) participants
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studied a list of words in blocks using either shallow encoding (i.e., are the first and last letters of
the word in alphabetical order?) or deep encoding (i.e., rating words as concrete vs. abstract).
During recognition testing the majority of trials were presented with an environmental cue
(reading Likely Old or Likely New) one second prior to the appearance of the recognition probe.
The participants were explicitly informed of cue validity (75% valid) and told to use the cues to
benefit their performance. Ideal performance requires observers to integrate internal memory
evidence with cue information or statistical priors. Thus, a 75% valid Likely Old cue should bias
observers to respond old more often since the statistical prior heavily favors an old response
(odds of encountering an old item are 3:1). In contrast, a 75% valid Likely New cue should bias
observers to respond new more often since the statistical prior heavily favors a new response
(odds of encountering a new item are 1:3). Results revealed participants were in fact able to
achieve performance benefits by flexibly shifting the decision criterion in line with the cues.
Although the above studies demonstrate a large number of conditions in which observers
adaptively bias recognition judgments, there appear to be some situations in which they are
surprisingly unwilling or unable to appropriately bias their recognition judgments. For example,
Stretch and Wixted (1998b) failed to find criterion shifts when manipulating strength on an itemby-item level, even when using salient perceptual cues to indicate memory strength. In their
experiment participants studied a list of words where half of the items were strong items that
were repeated five times and presented in one color (e.g., red) and the other half of the items
were weak items presented only once and in a different color (e.g., green). At test previously
studied items were presented in the same color as during study and intermixed with lures, half of
which were presented in one color and half of which were presented in the other color. Despite
increased accuracy for strong items, participants’ criteria remained the same for both strong and
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weak items as demonstrated by equivalent false alarm rates across both colors, even after they
were explicitly told the relationship between the colors and the two study conditions.	
  Prior work
clearly demonstrates that observers can shift strategies based on simple instructions, and given
this, Stretch and Wixted (1998b) found the lack of shift surprising leading to the ad hoc
explanation that it must have been too effortful for participants to shift their criteria on a trial-bytrial basis. However, it is also the case that the manipulation was potentially contradictory in that
while color clearly signaled encoding strength for studied materials, it did not do so when paired
with novel materials. That is, half the time seeing a word in red would elicit strong memories
since the items were well encoded; however, the other half the time seeing a word in red would
elicit minimal memory evidence since half of the novel items were also presented in red. Thus
the diagnostic value of a red cue in this design was fairly subtle. On average, it signaled a
slightly higher mean strength signal than the green color cue and this ambiguity might not have
indicated a clear biasing strategy for the subject on each individual trial. Furthermore, because
several studies have demonstrated observers are in fact able to adaptively update their decision
criteria in a trial wise manner (e.g., Dobbins & Kroll, 2005; Jaeger, Lauris, Selmeczy, &
Dobbins, 2012b; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013), it does not appear to be
the case that the simple requirement to repeatedly alter one’s decision bias on a trial-by-trial
basis is the cause of the above failure to see adaptive recognition biases. 	
  
This discrepancy between findings suggests that various factors may influence whether
criterion shifts are observed. For example, criterion shifts are likely to occur when participants
are provided with explicit knowledge of the manipulation either via instructions or feedback that
renders the appropriate strategic bias fairly obvious. Verde and Rotello (2007) demonstrated that
participants only appropriately shifted their response criteria to changes in target strength, such
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that they responded more conservatively to targets repeated four times relative to once repeated
targets, when trial-by-trial feedback was supplied. When manipulating base rate proportions and
not informing participants of this manipulation, multiple studies have found that the presence of
feedback resulted in more appropriate response criterion placement relative to when no feedback
was presented (Estes & Maddox, 1995; Kantner & Lindsay, 2010; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007).
Since a shift in response criterion reflects an atypical way of responding to memoranda
on the part of the participants, it presumably must be initiated in response to some environmental
cue that signals a bias would be advantageous. Although feedback seems to be critical for both
within list and between list criterion shifts, in the absence of feedback the recognized utility of
these biasing cues may depend upon their salience (i.e., will it be detected as potentially useful
by the observer) and perceived reliability (i.e., is there a way to establish that it generally
predicts one type of memory stimulus (e.g., old) compared to another (e.g., new). For example,
in Stretch and Wixted (1998a) while differences in word color were likely a very perceptually
salient cue, these color cues did not reliably signal whether the stimuli were old or new. However,
in Selmeczy and Dobbins (2013) criterion shifts were observed even in the absence of feedback
presumably because participants were explicitly provided with cues (Likely Old and Likely
New) that were both salient and reliably predictive of item status (75% valid). Furthermore, the
appropriate decision strategy on each individual trial is quite clear with such a cue. Overall,
although adaptive criterion shifts during recognition judgments often occur, it appears as though
observing these shifts may require a great deal of external support such as feedback, explicit
instructions, and/or other environmental cues that are both salient and reliably predict item status.
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1.3 Cognitive Control and Criterion Regulation
As noted earlier, prior research examining recognition criteria largely assumes that
adaptive criterion movements are a result of explicit strategies. This assumption is either stated
explicitly when researchers describe criterion adjustments as being cognitively demanding, or it
is inherent in the type of manipulation used to alter responding. For example, instructing
participants to respond liberally or conservatively necessarily assumes that observers should be
able to intentionally manipulate their decision strategy. Additionally, base rate or memorability
manipulations imply that observers are aware that some difference exists between contexts in
which items occur and they can incorporate this relevant information into a strategic bias.
However, as previously discussed, certain manipulations may require external support such as
feedback and/or explicit instructions in order to observe criterion shifts. Furthermore, within list
criteria manipulations require altering of decision biases on a trial-by-trial, often randomized
basis. Since criterion regulation often involves some combination of maintaining an explicit
strategy, holding the location of multiple criteria in memory, and shifting between these
locations, it is reasonable to conclude that criterion regulation may depend on cognitive control
or a conscious, limited capacity, and goal oriented process. Other literature examining control
using different attentional tasks (e.g., Stroop) has suggested that list-wide and item-specific
control may operate by separate mechanisms (for review see Bugg & Crump, 2012), and this
may also be true in the case of recognition criterion regulation. However, the role of cognitive
control in adaptive recognition criterion movements is still a largely unexplored topic (however
see Dobbins & Kroll, 2005; Konkel, Selmeczy, & Dobbins, 2014) and the current proposal will
mainly examine the degree of control observers can exercise during within list manipulations.
Thus, if criterion regulation is a volitional or controlled process, observers should be able to
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exercise an appropriate bias under varying contexts when encouraged to do so and critically to
prevent themselves from shifting their decision criteria when instructed to do so. However, the
set of studies described in the next section demonstrate that observers may not be able to
completely prevent criteria shifts from occurring when provided with probabilistic cues that they
are instructed to ignore. These results suggest that in addition to controlled processing,
heretofore-unexplored automatic decision processes may also play a role in recognition judgment.

1.4 Putative Role of Automatic Processes in Criterion Regulation
As described previously, observers are often able to capitalize on reliable environmental
cues by adaptively biasing their recognition judgments. That is, when participants are provided
with probabilistic environmental cues (Likely Old and Likely New) that forecast the upcoming
status of a recognition probe, and are explicitly instructed to use these cues, they clearly
demonstrate cue related criterion shifts that result in net performance gains compared to when
the cues are unavailable (e.g., Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). Although capitalizing on reliable
environmental cues can clearly be adaptive, as mentioned previously there are instances where
the goal of an observer may not be to maximize the proportion of correct responses but instead
some other goal is relevant such as maximizing expected value. For example, during eyewitness
testimony the goal of the eyewitness is to describe the original memory as faithfully as possible
and not be influenced by information he/she may have heard after the event. In other words, the
observer is maximizing social rewards by providing a high fidelity report without being
contaminated by other environmental cues. Reporting memory events accurately when other
influential factors are also present in the environment would require that observers separate their
internal memory evidence (e.g., the original memory event one witnessed) from external
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information signaling a stimulus is likely novel or previously encountered (e.g., hearing
something afterwards about a suspect). Critically, under SDT these two processes (i.e., evidence
and decision processes) are assumed to be independent such that decision processes can be
altered while evidence based processes are fixed within a given context. As mentioned
previously, this is analogous to reporting vowels during a vision exam where one might deeply
wish to be able to see the smallest line of letters, but this will not actually improve the internal
resolution of the vision system. Additionally, even if one overhears a friend’s correct answers
during the vision exam this information could influence the decision process but it would not
improve internal resolution. The set of pilot experiments described below examined whether
observers can in fact separate internal memory evidence from environmental information during
recognition judgments by instructing participants to disregard probabilistic environmental cues.
During the first pilot experiment participants were given a recognition test where the
majority of trials were preceded with a cue (reading Likely Old or Likely New) intermixed with
uncued or baseline trials. Participants were informed of cue validity (75%) and in the first and
third study/test cycles they were instructed to use the cues to increase their performance, while in
the second and fourth study/test cycles they were instructed to ignore the cues and rely solely on
their own memory when making their decision. In order to ensure participants did not forget
which test block they were in the words “USE CUES” or “IGNORE CUES” remained on the
screen during the entire test period. The experiment order remained fixed such that participants
always began with instructions to use cues; this was done to help ensure that participants’ initial
experience clearly demonstrated that cues were useful and therefore they do not simply ignore
the cues in the following test blocks because they believed them to be unreliable. As expected,
when participants were instructed to use cues a large criterion shift was observed between Likely
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Old and Likely New cued trials; however, results revealed that under ignore instructions
participants still displayed a significant criterion shift between Likely Old and Likely New cued
trials, although this effect was dampened compared to the use instructions condition (See Figure
2). If criterion positioning were under full strategic control, then it is unclear why the measured
criterion shifted when observers were instructed to ignore the cues. These results suggest that
participants may not be able to fully isolate environmental cues forecasting likely memory
outcomes from their assessments of internal memory evidence, which is fairly problematic under
situations where unbiased reporting is critical. However, it may be the case that observers did not
follow instructions to ignore cues because it required them to sacrifice accuracy without a clear
payoff for doing so. In other words, since the participants knew the cues were reliable and could
result in performance gains in terms of the percentage of correct responses, they may have
ignored the instructions asking them to rely purely on their own memory evidence and still
incorporated the cues. In this case, the observed results could be due to participants disobeying
the instructions and trying to maximize accuracy instead of judgment fidelity.
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0.4!
0.2!
C! 0.0!
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-0.4!
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Likely New!

Use Instructions!

Likely Old!

!

Likely New!

Ignore Instructions!

Figure 2. Pilot data results. The y-axis represents criterion (C) and the x-axis represents each
cue type (Black: Likely Old, Gray: Likely New) for both use and ignore instructions.
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In order to control for the possibility that participants may have disobeyed the
instructions in order to maximize accuracy, in a second pilot experiment participants were given
two opportunities to respond during each recognition trial. During the first response (Me-Only),
they were instructed to base responding solely on their own memory content and completely
ignore the cue present in the environment. During their second response, they were instructed to
base their responses on joint consideration of their memory content and the environmental cue.
This latter response was termed ‘Me+Cue’. The purpose of this two-response procedure was to
circumvent the possibility that a desire for accuracy was precluding participants from ignoring
the cues in our earlier studies. Because the second response involved joint consideration of the
cue and internal evidence, participants would always be able to maximize final trial accuracy.
Overall, the results from the two-response design once again revealed that participants
could not fully ignore environmental cues. Critically, during the first/Me-Only response, when
cues should have been ignored, participants still shifted their criteria and responded
conservatively under a Likely New cue and liberally under a Likely Old cue. More extreme
criterion shifts were observed during the second/Me+Cue response, suggesting that participants
were further incorporating cues when instructed to do so during their second response (See
Figure 3, left panel). Thus, even when using a design where participants could capitalize on the
cues during their second responses (and thus were not sacrificing eventual use of the cue) their
initial responses were still biased, apparently unwittingly, by the presence of a predictive cue in
the environment. Consistent with the first experiment, once again these results suggest that
observers cannot fully discount probabilistic cues during recognition judgments.
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However, a simple potential explanation for these results could be that the cues were
influencing a motor preparatory response as opposed to the recognition decision per se. For
example, motor preparation may result in a small number of inadvertent, anticipatory key presses
that were minimally or not at all dependent upon accruing memory evidence. To rule out this
possibility a third experiment was conducted once again using the two response design, except
old/new responses were made via a mouse click to randomized regions of the monitor in order to
indicate old (green square) or new (red square) decisions. This precluded the development of a
motor response bias because the motor movement required to register a particular decision could
not be predicted in advance. Results revealed that participants still rendered biased recognition
judgments when cues were present during the initial first/Me-Only response, and thus our prior
findings were not simply due to motor preparation errors (See Figure 3, right panel).
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Experiment 2

C

Experiment 3

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.0

-0.2

-0.2

-0.4

-0.4

-0.6

-0.6

-0.8

-0.8

-1.0

-1.0
First/Me-Only
Response

Second/Me+Cue
Response

Likely Old
Likely New

Mean
Mean±SE
Mean±2*SE
First/Me-Only
Response

Second/Me+Cue
Response

Figure 3. Pilot data results using two-response design. The y-axis represents criterion (C) and
the x-axis represents each cue type (Black: Likely Old, Gray: Likely New) under the first/MeOnly and Second/Me+Cue response. The left panel represents Experiment 2 during which
fixed keys were used to indicate old/new decisions, while the right panel represents
Experiment 3 during which randomized locations on screen were used to indicate old/new
decisions.
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Despite explicit instructions, my pilot data demonstrate that participants cannot fully
ignore probabilistic environmental cues, suggesting that observers may not have complete
control over their recognition judgments once a predictive environmental cue has been processed.
Instead, it appears as though participants may, in part, be unintentionally or automatically
influenced by environmental cues despite their best efforts to ignore them. This is somewhat
surprising because the cues themselves are not critically tied to test stimuli, which are never
repeated throughout the test, but are instead tied to item status (i.e., old vs. new). Additionally, as
already noted above, the effect cannot be explained as a result of advance motor response
preparation. These results suggest that there may be some confusion on the part of the observers
between the information signaled by the environmental cue (that an upcoming stimulus is likely
to be old or new) and the information signaled by the memoranda itself, which broadly means
that there is some confusion between internal memory evidence and environmental information.
Although participants are instructed to ignore cues, an unintentional cue influence may
result because observers nonetheless anticipate the upcoming sensation or experience of
familiarity or novelty signaled by the cue and this expectation then changes the manner in which
the signal itself is subjectively experienced. Since the cues are reliable and participants are
informed of this information, a preparatory response driven by environmental cues, such as
mobilizing attentional resources towards experiences of familiarity or novelty, may develop and
result in fairly automatic behavior. In other words, observers presumably build an expectation
such that a Likely Old cue elicits an anticipation of feelings of familiarity (or recollection)
whereas a Likely New cue elicits anticipation of feelings of novelty. This cue driven expectancy
may in fact contaminate the processing of the evoked memory signal, such that items following a
Likely Old cue are more likely to be processed as old, whereas items following a Likely New cue
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are more likely to be processed as new. Under this model, the anticipation itself alters the
subsequent subjective experience. We refer to this hypothesis as an expectancy based account of
automatic cue influence and the current experiments aimed to test the predictions of this
hypothesis.
To summarize, the pilot data suggest that in our previous use of the Explicit Memory Cueing
paradigm, where observers were always encouraged to use the cues, there may have been two
separate processes occurring- an explicit or controlled process that participants intentionally
engage in, and also putatively automatic or cue driven preparation process that participants are
unable to override, perhaps because they are unaware that the cues are influencing their
judgments during ignore instructions conditions. From this perspective, observed shifts in
decision criteria may reflect a controlled response strategy on the part of the observers in which
they attempt to maximize some long term goal during responding; however, the observed shifts
may also reflect a biased consideration or evaluation of memory evidence itself such that signals
that are consistent with expectations are processed more fluently or perceived as more salient.
Such an effect would be difficult to control since from the observers’ perspective it would not
clearly be identifiable as a bias. However, this latter process was only revealed when participants
were instead instructed to ignore these environmental cues, where participants appear to only be
able to limit one process (i.e., explicit cue use) but an unintentional or automatic influence of
cues remains. It is the full pattern of data that suggest an implicit influence is occurring and
critically it is not clear one can inhibit an influence of which one is unaware.
Although conceptualizations of automaticity vary (see Moors & De Houwer, 2006),
automatic behavior tends to be described as fast acting, unintentional, and difficult to override,
while controlled behavior is described as slower, effortful, strategic, and goal oriented (Posner &
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Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). I addressed several questions mainly concerning
observers’ ability to limit the influence of environmental cues by testing the expectancy
hypothesis described above. I tested whether the unintentional influence of environmental cues
could be eliminated if cue based expectations no longer occurred by presenting environmental
cues after recognition probes (Experiment 1) or providing participants with random or
uninformative cues (Experiment 3). Additionally, one possibility is that even if participants are
aware that the cues automatically lead them to expect certain outcomes (i.e., they are aware that
they experience an expectation of familiarity or novelty), they may not be aware that these
expectations color or flavor their interpretation of actual memory evidence (i.e., they are not
aware that their responding is actually biased). Therefore, I also examined whether participants
have any explicit awareness that an unintentional cue influence has occurred (Experiment 2).
Finally, in order to rule out the possibility that previous findings were simply due to a lack of
motivation from participants to follow our instructions, I also tested whether providing
participants with monetary incentives to ignore cues would eliminate the influence of cues
(Experiment 4).
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Chapter 2
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 assessed when during the decision process environmental cues exert their
influence and whether participants can fully ignore cues when they no longer anticipate
recognition experiences. Prior work using the Explicit Memory Cueing paradigm always had the
presentation of the cue precede the recognition probe. If a cue is presented prior to the memory
probe, it can elicit an expectation of upcoming familiarity or novelty that may influence the
processing of the probe itself. However, if the cue is presented after a recognition judgment has
already been made, there can be no expectancy mediated processing of the probes and perhaps
the influence of the cues could be fully eliminated. Thus, if participants have already made their
decision uninfluenced by any environmental cue, asking them to then ignore a cue that later
appears just requires maintaining one’s original judgment, even if this judgment has only
covertly been reached by the time the environmental cue appears.
Thus, under the expectancy based account participants should be able to ignore cues
when they are presented after a recognition probe provided that sufficient time between the probe
and cue has elapsed. In contrast, when the cue presentation follows more proximally to the probe
an increased influence is predicted because the expectation effect will have time to operate.

2.1 Methods
Participants. Experiment 1 included 27 participants recruited from the Washington University
Experimetrix pool (average age=22.37, 18 females) who were paid $10 per hour for their
participation. All participants provided informed consent in accordance with the University’s
review board.
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Materials and Procedure. Participants entered their responses via keyboard and all responses
were self-paced. The timing and presentation of experiments was generated using Matlab’s
Psychophysics Toolbox (Version 3.0.8; Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). For each participant, study
and test words were randomly selected from a 1,216-item pool, with an average of 7.09 letters
and 2.34 syllables and average log HAL frequency of 7.74 log.
To overview, participants completed 4 study/test cycles where the initial study/test cycle
instructed participants to use environmental cues that were presented prior to the recognition
probe. The remaining study/test cycles instructed participants to ignore environmental cues that
were presented after the recognition probe at various delays (See Figure 4 for timing and details).
To avoid fatigue, participants were encouraged to take a short break between each study/test
cycle.
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Use Test Cycle
USE CUE

USE CUE

Likely Old

Likely Old
HAPPY
Old or New?

..."

1 second

USE CUE

..."
HAPPY
Confidence?

Self Paced Response

Self Paced Response

Ignore Test Cycle
IGNORE CUE

..."
MELON
Word presented for
short, medium, or
long delay before
cue appears

IGNORE CUE

IGNORE CUE

Likely Old

Likely Old

MELON

1 second

..."

IGNORE CUE

..."

MELON

MELON

Old or New?

Confidence?

Self Paced Response Self Paced Response

IGNORE CUE

??CUE??
Likely Old or Likely New

Catch Trial

Figure 4. Test design Experiment 1. During the first test cycle, participants were instructed to
use cues. The cue appeared in isolation for 1 second prior to the probe. During the 2nd-4th test
cycles, participants were instructed to ignore cues. The cue appeared after the probe at
various lags (see text for more details).
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During study participants performed a syllable counting task (i.e., does this word contain
1, 2, 3 or more syllables?) on a list of serially presented words (78 items). Syllable counting was
used in all experiments in order to produce moderate levels of subsequent recognition memory
performance and limit variation in encoding strategies. Immediately after study, participants
completed a recognition test where they indicated whether the word presented was ‘old’
(previously studied) or ‘new’ (not previously encountered in the experiment) (78 old items, 78
new items). After each recognition decision, participants made a confidence rating using a 6point scale ranging from 50%-100% in 10% increments with 50% indicating guessing and 100%
indicating certainty.
During the first test cycle the majority of test trials were preceded by a 75% reliable cue
reading Likely Old or Likely New that appeared one second before the recognition probe (88
cued items-44 old, 44 new), while the remaining trials were uncued or baseline trials (68
uncued/baseline items-34 old, 34 new). Participants were explicitly informed about the reliability
of the cue. Critically, during the initial study/test cycle participants were instructed to use cues
with the following instructions: “Since the cues are accurate 75% of the time, you should try and
USE THE CUES to increase your performance.” In order to remind participants of these
instructions, the words “USE THE CUES” in green font were presented at the top of the screen
during the test cycle. Although I was mainly interested in examining whether participants could
ignore external cues, the first study/test cycle had participants use cues to help ensure that
participants’ initial experience with the cues demonstrated that the cues were in fact reliable
indicators. Otherwise any failure to find a cue influence during ignore instructions may have
simply resulted from a disbelief they were reliable indicators of memory status.
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During the 2nd-4th test cycles the majority of test trials were followed by a 75% reliable
cue reading Likely Old or Likely New, which participants were told to ignore with the following
instructions “Even though the cues are accurate 75% of the time, you should IGNORE THE
CUES and make your decision solely on your own memory.” The words IGNORE THE CUES
remained on screen in red font throughout the test cycle. Critically, the cues appeared after the
recognition probe following a short, medium, or long lag (48 cued items-24 old, 24 new- at each
delay), while other trials were uncued/baseline trials (12 uncued items- 6 old, 6). For all
participants the shortest delay was fixed at 300ms in order to examine the effect of presenting the
cue nearly simultaneously to the recognition probe. The remaining cue lags were titrated to each
individual and calculated using measured reaction times from uncued/baseline trials during the
first study/test cycle. A medium delay was calculated by taking the 50th percentile of each
participants’ uncued/baseline response time distribution (M=1.73 seconds, SD=0.50,
Range=0.96- 3.38) and the long delay was calculated by taking the 90th percentile of the
distribution (M= 4.12 seconds, SD=2.00, Range=1.46-8.99). These percentiles were chosen
based on the assumption that for the 50th percentile participants would have likely rendered a
covert old/new judgment for approximately half of the post-cued trials, whereas at their 90th
percentile they would have likely have completed their recognition decision for the majority of
post-cued trials. After the cue appeared, participants were not allowed to respond until the cue
was on screen for one second, which was done in order to match lexical processing time of the
cue between use and ignore test cycles. After this one second processing of the cue, participants
could key in their self-paced old/new decision followed by their confidence response.
Although my prior work clearly demonstrates that participants were influenced by cues
despite our instructions to ignore them, one potential concern with the current design is that
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participants may not actually process cues that are presented after the probe and thus any absence
of cue influence could be interpreted as simply reflecting the failure to even read the cue. In
order to ensure that results would not be due to participants simply not reading cues, occasional
catch trials (48 items-24 old, 24 new-split equally across delay conditions) were included that
occurred after confidence ratings. During catch trials the word ‘???CUE???’ appeared on screen
and participants had to indicate as quickly as possible whether the most recent cue, which was no
longer on screen, read Likely Old or Likely New. Catch trial responses were made using a
different hand and set of keys than old/new responses in order to avoid confusing the two
judgments.
Finally, at the end of the experiment participants answered a short questionnaire
assessing how well they followed the instructions. Participants were asked “How well were you
able to follow the instructions to USE cues?” and “How well were you able to follow the
instructions to IGNORE cues?” using a 5-point likert scale with the verbal anchors “Never”
listed for 1 and “Always” listed for 5. These ratings were used to assess whether self-rated
judgments of compliance were linked to objective assessments of cue influence (e.g., do
individuals who report always ignoring cues display no cue influence).

2.2 Results and Discussion
For all experiments hit rates of one and false alarm rates of zero were replaced with 1-1/(2N) and
1/(2N) respectively, where N is the number of trials on which that proportion is based
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). This was done to calculate Signal Detection measures that
require using a reverse normal transform, which is undefined for perfect performance.
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Criterion. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics for response rates, accuracy, and criteria. The
first analysis simply investigated whether participants were differentially influenced by cues as a
function of use vs. ignore instruction using the Signal Detection measure C. Recall that under the
expectancy hypothesis the influence of cues should be largely minimized or completely
eliminated when the cue is presented after the recognition probe. Changes in criteria (C) were
assessed using a 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of instruction (use vs. ignore)
and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New). Critically, this initial analyses averaged across the
three ignore test cycles and collapsed across cue lag (short, medium, long). There was no main
effect of instruction, F(1,25)=0.00, p=.98, ηp=.00, suggesting that the mean criterion did not
change as a function of use vs. ignore instructions. The main effect of cue type was significant,
F(1,25)=70.94, p<.001, ηp=.74 demonstrating a large effect size with participants responding
more liberally under a Likely Old vs. Likely New cue (-0.55 vs. 0.22). However, this main effect
was conditioned by a significant interaction between instruction and cue type, F(1,25)=31.74,
p<.001, ηp=.56. Follow up post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) revealed a significant difference
between Likely Old and Likely New cues under use instructions (-0.72 vs. 0.39, p<.001).
Critically, although the magnitude of the effect was smaller, the difference between Likely Old
vs. Likely New cues was also significant displaying a large effect size (Cohen’s d=1.36) when
participants were instructed to ignore cues (-0.39 vs. 0.05, p<.001).
This initial finding that participants remained strongly influenced by cues during ignore
instructions seems to suggest that the influence of cues was not eliminated when the cue was
presented after the recognition probe. However, under the expectancy hypothesis a critical
prediction was that the effect of the cues should diminish as the lag between the probe and cue
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onset increased. That is, when the cue lag is short the cue likely appears before participants have
completed their covert recognition judgment and therefore should exert a larger influence
resulting in larger criteria shifts. In contrast, as cue lag increases a greater proportion of covert
recognition decisions should be completed and hence the influence of the cue itself on processing
should presumably be lessened. To examine this prediction we assessed criterion (C) for ignore
test cycles using a 2 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of cue type (Likely Old vs.
Likely New) and cue lag (short, medium, vs. long). As expected based on the previous analysis,
results revealed a significant main effect of cue type, F(1,26)=46.82, p<.001, ηp=.64 with
participants responding more liberally under a Likely Old vs. Likely New cues (-0.40 vs. 0.05).
The main effect of cue lag was not significant, F(2,52)=1.05, p=.36, ηp=.04, simply indicating
that the average criterion did not differ across the lags. Finally, the interaction between cue type
and cue lag was also not significant, F(2,52)=1.13, p=.33, ηp=.04 (See Figure 5). Thus,
participants were unable to ignore the lagged cues during the ignore blocks and moreover the
influence of the cues was not heightened on short relative to long lagged durations. This
challenges the expectancy account because even when the cue no longer served a preparatory
role, participants were still influenced and increasing cue lags did not diminish this influence
when measured by shifts in criteria.
However, it is important to note that optimal criterion shifting is dependent on baseline
recognition skill. Observers with higher baseline accuracy should shift less in response to cues
than those with lower baseline accuracy (Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). To account for
differences in baseline skill and increase power to detect an interaction between cue type and cue
lag, another measure called C-prime (C’) was also examined. C-prime (C’) is a criterion measure
normalized by accuracy and was calculated by dividing each participants’ criterion (C) by his/her
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dprime (d’) during uncued/baseline trials (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Critically, when
rerunning the 2 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely
New) and cue lag (short, medium, vs. long) using C-prime, the interaction between cue lag and
cue type was not significant, F(2,50)=0.58, p=.56, ηp=.02 . Thus, even when controlling for
differences in baseline recognition skill the influence of cues was not greater on short relative to
long lagged durations.
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Table 1. Average response rates, accuracy, and criterion with standard deviations in
parenthesis (Experiment 1)

HR

CR

d'

C

Uncued/Baseline

0.83

(0.09)

0.72

(0.14)

1.66

(0.54)

-0.18

(0.29)

Cued

0.84

(0.1)

0.78

(0.1)

1.96

(0.63)

-0.13

(0.32)

Likely Old Cue

0.91

(0.09)

0.52

(0.27)

1.60

(0.79)

-0.74

(0.56)

Likely New Cue

0.62

(0.26)

0.87

(0.09)

1.70

(0.81)

0.39

(0.46)

Ignore Instructions
HR
Uncued/Baseline

CR

d'

C

0.77

(0.2)

0.66

(0.18)

1.33

(0.75)

-0.21 (0.51)

Cued

0.79

(0.14)

0.72

(0.14)

1.55

(0.59)

-0.12 (0.41)

Likely Old Cue

0.82

(0.13)

0.57

(0.21)

1.27

(0.71)

-0.39 (0.49)

Likely New Cue

0.69

(0.19)

0.77

(0.14)

1.43

(0.64)

0.12 (0.48)

Cued

0.80

(0.14)

0.70

(0.15)

1.53

(0.52)

-0.18

Likely Old Cue

0.83

(0.14)

0.59

(0.2)

1.34

(0.59)

-0.42 (0.48)

Likely New Cue

0.71

(0.18)

0.74

(0.15)

1.38

(0.63)

0.03 (0.45)

Cued

0.80

(0.13)

0.70

(0.13)

1.48

(0.57)

-0.18 (0.35)

Likely Old Cue

0.82

(0.13)

0.60

(0.18)

1.33

(0.58)

-0.39 (0.45)

Likely New Cue

0.72

(0.17)

0.73

(0.13)

1.34

(0.66)

0.01 (0.39)

Short Cue Delay

Medium Cue Delay
(0.4)

Long Cue Delay
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Criterion
Likely Old

Likely New

0.8
0.4

C

0.0
−0.4
−0.8
−1.2

Short

Medium

Use

Long

Ignore Lags

Figure 5. Criterion Experiment 1. The graph depicts average criterion (C) under Likely Old
(black) and Likely New (gray) cues during use instructions, and short, medium, and long cue
lags during ignore instructions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the mean.
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Confidence. Although the absences of lag effects in the criterion analysis failed to support the
expectancy hypothesis, confidence may be a more sensitive indicator of cueing effects because it
is more finely grained and more dependent upon introspection. Recall that participants used a 6point confidence scale (50-100% in 10% increments) after each recognition decision. While
simple dichotomous old/new reports may not be influenced by cue lag, subtle differences may be
captured through this more finely grained scale. Additionally, confidence is a more introspective
judgment regarding one’s performance (a.k.a metacognition) and it may be the case the subtle
cueing influences would be reflected in one’s self assessment of the ease of a judgment without
necessarily showing up as an influence in the direction of judgment. For the analyses below, one
subject was removed due to reporting 100% confidence for all but two responses; however,
excluding this participant did not change the overall findings. Additionally, all confidence
analyses focused on correct responses (i.e., hits and correct rejections) since incorrect responses
were relatively infrequent and provided much less reliable estimates. See Table 2 for descriptive
statistics for confidence.

	
  

35	
  

	
  

Table 2. Average confidence with standard deviations in parenthesis (Experiment 1)
	
  
Use Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Uncued/Baseline

86.09

(8.57)

77.50

(12.43)

Likely Old Cue

87.37

(7.46)

73.71

(13.57)

Likely New Cue

84.60

(8.14)

80.99

(11.04)

Ignore Instructions
Hits
Uncued/Baseline

Correct Rejections

86.19

(9.92)

79.03

(12.33)

Likely Old Cue

86.09

(8.16)

74.03

(13.85)

Likely New Cue

85.30

(9.93)

79.68

(10.68)

Likely Old Cue

86.98

(7.31)

76.56

(12.10)

Likely New Cue

86.72

(9.70)

80.00

(10.54)

Likely Old Cue

86.65

(8.30)

77.52

(11.03)

Likely New Cue

85.66

(9.33)

80.00

(10.38)

Short Cue lag

Medium Cue lag

Long Cue lag
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Hits
Changes in hit confidence were assessed using a 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with
factors of instruction (use vs. ignore) and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New). Once again this
initial analyses averaged across all three ignore cycles and collapsed across cue lag conditions.
Results revealed no main effect of instruction F(1,24)=0.18, p=.67, ηp=.007, suggesting overall
hit confidence remained the same for use vs. ignore instructions. The main effect of cue type was
significant F(1,24)=6.23, p=.01, ηp=.20, with higher confidence during Likely Old relative to
Likely New cued trials (87.20 vs. 85.40). The interaction between instruction and cue type was
marginally significant F(1,24)=2.96, p=.10, ηp=.11. Although the interaction was only
marginally significant, post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) demonstrated that the effect of cue type
was more apparent under use instructions (Likely Old 87.37 vs. Likely New 84.60, p=.02),
whereas under ignore instructions average hit confidence remained nearly identical as function of
cue type (Likely Old 86.84 vs. Likely New 86.20, p=.91). Thus, hit confidence does not seem to
be affected when instructed to ignore cues (See Figure 6, top panel).

Correct Rejections
Turning to correct rejection confidence, the 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with
factors of instruction (use vs. ignore) and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) revealed no
significant main effect of instruction, F (1,25)=0.320, p=.58, ηp=.01. The main effect of cue type
was significant, F(1,25)=48.77, p<.001, ηp=.66, with higher confidence during Likely New vs.
Likely Old cues (80.43 vs. 74.90). However these main effects were conditioned by a significant
interaction between instruction and cue type, F(1,25)=11.04, p=.002, ηp=.31. Follow up post-hoc
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tests (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that during use instructions there was a significant difference
between Likely New vs. Likely Old correct rejection confidence (80.99 vs. 73.71, p<.001).
During ignore instructions, there was a smaller but also significant difference between Likely
New vs. Likely Old correct rejection confidence (79.89 vs. 76.04, p<.001). Thus, in contrast to
hit confidence, correct rejection confidence was influenced by cues during ignore instructions.
Critically, to determine whether cue lag had an affect during ignore instructions a 2 X 3
repeated measured ANOVA with factors of cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) and cue lag
(short, medium, vs. long) was conducted. As expected given the prior analysis, the main effect of
cue type was significant, F(1,25)=26.62, p=<.001, ηp=.51, with higher confidence on Likely New
relative to Likely Old cued trials (79.89 vs. 76.04). The main effect of cue lag was also
significant, F(2,50)=5.28, p=.008, ηp=.17; however, these main effects were conditioned by a
significant interaction between cue type and cue lag, F(2,50)=3.13, p=.05, ηp=.11. Critically,
follow up simple effects analyses revealed a significant linear trend for cue lag under Likely Old,
F(1,25)=7.60, p=.01, ηp=.23, but not Likely New cues, F(1,25)=0.29, p=.60, ηp=.01 (See Figure
6, bottom panel). Thus, in contrast to the criterion and accuracy analyses, the influence of cues
was affected by cue lag for correct rejection confidence and this effect seemed to be driven by
Likely New or invalid cues. Importantly, these results are in line with the expectancy hypothesis
such that the influence of cues was larger during short cue lags relative to longer cue lags.
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Figure 6. Confidence Experiment 1. The graph depicts average confidence for hits (top panel)
and correction rejections (bottom panel) under Likely Old (black) and Likely New (gray) cues
during use instructions, and short, medium, and long cue lags during ignore instructions. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the mean.
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Reaction Time. The next analyses turned to examining reaction times. While the criterion and
accuracy data seemed to suggest there is no effect of cue lag, the confidence data did find an
effect in the direction predicted by the expectancy hypothesis (i.e., larger influence of cues
during short lags vs. long lags) at least for correct rejections. Like the confidence data, reaction
time may prove to be more sensitive to the effects of cue lag.
Medians, as opposed to means, were used for estimating reaction time since response
time distributions are positively skewed and the median is less influenced by outliers. Therefore,
all the reaction time results reported below will consider the average of median reaction times
across participants. Again, the analyses focused on correct responses (i.e., hits and correct
rejections) since errors occurred less frequently and provided less reliable estimates. See Table 3
for descriptive statistics in reaction time for old/new judgments.
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Table 3. Average median reaction time in seconds for old/new judgments with
standard deviations in parenthesis (Experiment 1)
	
  
Use Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Uncued/Baseline

1.60

(0.46)

1.78

(0.54)

Likely Old Cue

1.50

(0.36)

2.57

(1.60)

Likely New Cue

2.27

(0.98)

1.64

(0.41)

Ignore Instructions
Hits
Uncued/Baseline

Correct Rejections

1.75

(0.51)

2.17

(0.93)

Likely Old Cue

0.64

(0.29)

0.98

(0.52)

Likely New Cue

0.73

(0.24)

0.75

(0.41)

Likely Old Cue

0.49

(0.23)

0.59

(0.28)

Likely New Cue

0.54

(0.25)

0.50

(0.20)

Likely Old Cue

0.47

(0.16)

0.57

(0.27)

Likely New Cue

0.53

(0.22)

0.49

(0.19)

Short Cue lag

Medium Cue lag

Long Cue lag
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Reaction Time for Old/New Judgment
Hits
Reaction time analyses focused on ignore test cycles only, since the comparison between
use and ignore study cycles is not meaningful due to differences in the timing of the cue. During
use instructions, the cue appeared on screen for one second in isolation followed by the old/new
prompt and recognition probe. In contrast, during ignore instructions the cue appeared after the
recognition probe at varying cue lags and it remained on screen for one second before
participants could key in their old/new decision (see Figure 4). Therefore, reaction time is
expected to be much faster during ignore test cycles since participants viewed the probe before
being explicitly prompted for their old/new decisions. Focusing only on ignore test cycles, the
following analyses examined whether there was an influence of cue type and critically whether a
heightened influence of cues would be observed during shorter cue lags.
The 2 X 3 repeated measured ANOVA with factors of cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely
New) and cue lag (short, medium, and long) revealed a significant main effect of cue type,
F(1,26)=8.17, p=.008, ηp=.23, with faster reaction times during Likely Old relative to Likely
New cued trials (0.52 vs. 0.60). The main effect of cue lag was also significant, F(2,52)=25.85,
p<.001, ηp=.50. Post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed that reaction time was significantly slower
during short (0.69 seconds) relative to medium (0.51 seconds, p<.001) or long cue lags (0.50
seconds, p<.001). The effect of cue lag is not necessarily surprising since during short cue lags
participants only processed the recognition probe for 1.3 seconds (.30 seconds for the recognition
probe in isolation, 1 second for the cue and the recognition probe together) before the old/new
prompt appears. In contrast, for the medium and long lags on average participants viewed the
recognition probe for 2.73 and 5.12 seconds respectively before the old/new prompt appears.
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Therefore, the main effect of cue lag serves as a good manipulation check to verify that during
the short cue lag participants were still processing the probe when the cue appeared. Finally, the
cue type by cue lag interaction was not significant, F(2,52)=0.25, p=.70, ηp=.01, suggesting that
the effect of cues did not vary as a function of cue lag.

Correct Rejections
For correct rejections the 3 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of cue lag (short,
medium, vs. long) and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) revealed a main effect of cue type,
F(1,26)=12.32, p=.002, ηp=.32, with faster reaction times during Likely New vs. Likely Old cues
(0.58 vs. 0.72). The main effect of cue lag was also significant, F(2,52)=24.75, p<.001, ηp=.57.
Once again, post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed that reaction time was significantly slower
during short (0.87 seconds) relative to medium (0.55 seconds, p<.001) or long cue lags (0.53
seconds, p<.001). Again, this suggests cue lag was effective in manipulating whether the cue was
present while probe processing was still ongoing. The two-way interaction between cue lag and
cue type did not reach significance, F(2,52)=2.29, p=.11, ηp=.08. Thus, these results suggest that
correct rejection reaction time was similarly influenced by cues across all cue lag conditions.
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Reaction Time for Confidence Judgment
While median reaction times for old new decisions were influenced by cue type, once
again the effects of cues did not diminish across cue lags during ignore instructions. This result is
consistent with the criterion data and reinforce the conclusion that the dichotomous old/new
judgments, while sensitive to the cues under the ignore instructions, were not sensitive to the lag
manipulation. However, as the secondary confidence judgments appeared to demonstrate lag
effects under the ignore instructions, I further assessed whether an influence of lag was also
present in the reaction time of these confidence reports, once again focusing on the median
reaction time of each condition for each participant. See Table 4 for descriptive statistics of
reaction time for confidence judgments.
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Table 4. Average median reaction time in seconds for confidence judgments with
standard deviations in parenthesis (Experiment 1)
	
  

Use Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Uncued/Baseline

0.73

(0.44)

0.79

(0.44)

Likely Old Cue

0.66

(0.36)

1.07

(0.72)

Likely New Cue

0.95

(0.64)

0.77

(0.43)

Ignore Instructions
Hits
Uncued/Baseline

Correct Rejections

0.67

(0.38)

0.63

0.42

Likely Old Cue

0.50

(0.34)

0.68

(0.45)

Likely New Cue

0.61

(0.45)

0.52

(0.31)

Likely Old Cue

0.49

(0.33)

0.54

(0.40)

Likely New Cue

0.47

(0.31)

0.51

(0.32)

Likely Old Cue

0.49

(0.33)

0.57

(0.40)

Likely New Cue

0.53

(0.38)

0.52

(0.33)

Short Cue lag

Medium Cue lag

Long Cue lag
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Hits
I was critically interested in examining whether the influence of cues changed across cue
lags. The 3 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of cue lag (short, medium, vs. long) and
cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) revealed a significant main effect of cue type,
F(1,26)=4.29, p=.05, ηp=.14, with faster reaction times during Likely Old vs. Likely New cues
(0.49 vs. 0.54). The main effect of cue lag was also significant, F(2,52)=6.15, p=.004, ηp=.19.
Post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) showed that reaction time was significantly slower during short
(0.56 seconds) relative to medium cue lags (0.48 seconds, p=.003), and the difference between
short and long cue lags approached significance (0.51 seconds, p=.09). Overall this suggests that
even during confidence judgments reaction time was affected and took longer when the cue lag
was short. Critically, the two-way interaction between cue lag and cue type was also significant,
F(2,52)=3.65, p=.03, ηp=.12. Follow up simple effects analyses revealed a significant linear
trend for cue lag under Likely New, F(1,26)=4.93, p=.03, ηp=.23, but not Likely Old cues,
F(1,26)=0.56, p=.46, ηp=.15 (See Figure 7, top panel). Importantly, these results are in line with
the expectation hypothesis since the influence of cues diminishes as cue lag increases and this
seems to be due to the timing of the presentation of invalid (Likely New) cues.

Correct Rejections
The 3 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of cue lag (short, medium, vs. long)
and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) revealed a main effect of cue type, F(1,26)=9.47,
p=.004, ηp=.27, with faster reaction times during Likely New vs. Likely Old cues (0.52 vs. 0.59).
Cue lag was also significant, F(2,52)=9.24, p<.001, ηp=.26 and post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD)
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showed that reaction time was significantly slower during short (0.59 seconds) relative to
medium (0.52 seconds, p<.001) and long cue lags (0.54 seconds, p=.02). Again, this suggests
that even during confidence judgments reaction time was affected and took longer when the cue
lag was short. Critically, the two-way interaction between cue lag and cue type was also
significant, F(2,52)=7.04, p=.001, ηp=.21. Follow up simple effects analyses revealed a
significant linear trend for cue lag under Likely Old, F(1,26)=10.20, p=.003, ηp=.28, but not
Likely New cues, F(1,26)=0.29, p=.60, ηp=.01 (See Figure 7, bottom panel). Importantly, these
results are consistent with the expectation hypothesis since the influence of cues diminishes as
cue lag increases and this seems to due to the effect of invalid (Likely New) cues.
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Figure 7. Confidence reaction time Experiment 1. The graph depicts the average of median
reaction times (in seconds) for confidence judgments for hits (top panel) and correction
rejections (bottom panel). Likely Old (black) and Likely New (gray) cues are shown for
short, medium, and long cue lags during ignore instructions. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals for the mean.
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Additional Analysis. Additional analyses briefly examined performance on catch trials and
questionnaire responses. Recall that during some trials participants also completed catch trials
where they had to indicate whether the cue was Likely Old or Likely New on the preceding trial.
This was done in order to ensure that participants processed the cues during ignore instructions.
Proportion correct on catch trials was relatively high overall (M =.88, SD= 0.12). Additionally,
catch trial performance was not significantly different as a function of cue lag (short, medium, vs.
long) (means of .89, .88, vs. .89 respectively, F(2,52)=0.27, p=.77, ηp=.01). Although it is clear
that participants did not ignore cues based on the criteria analyses above, the relatively high
performance on catch trials serves to further indicate that participants were reading the cues.
However, since catch trial performance varied between individuals, it could be the case that
those individuals who performed worse on catch trials, and were less likely to have processed the
cue, may have also been less influenced by the cues under ignore instructions. However, the
correlation between catch trial performance and the degree of criteria shift (measured as the
difference in criterion (C) between Likely New vs. Likely Old cued trials) was not significant for
any of the cue lag conditions (ps>.15).
Finally, the relationship between self-reported measures of use or ignore instruction
compliance and actual measures of cue influence was also examined. Using a 5-point likert scale
(1-Never followed instructions, 5-Always followed instructions), participants on average
reported 3.26 (SD=1.02) for use instructions and 3.33 (SD=1.07) for ignore instructions. Thus, it
appears as though participants reported following instructions moderately and to a similar extent
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in use and ignore instructions. Using simple correlations, I assessed whether there was a
relationship between objective measures of cue influence (measured as Likely New C minus
Likely Old C) and participants’ self reports of instruction use. However, this relationship was not
significant for either use (r=.09, p=.65) or ignore instructions (short lag: r=-.09, p=.65; medium
lag: r=-.29, p=.15.; long lag: r=-.10, p=.60). Additionally, I also assessed cue influence using Cprime (C’) in order to account for individual differences in baseline accuracy. However, once
again the relationship between cue influence (Likely New C’ minus Likely Old C’) and self
reports of instruction compliance were not significant for use (r=-.04, p=.86) or ignore
instructions (short lag: r=-.01, p=.97; medium lag: r=-.22, p=.30; long lag: r=-.03, p=.89).
	
  
2.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated whether participants could ignore reliable environmental cues
that were presented after a recognition probe. Under an expectancy hypothesis, participants
should be able to ignore lagged cues since they no longer serve a preparatory role and cannot
drive expectancy based processing of the probe. More specifically, I predicted that lagged cues
should not have an influence when presented after a covert recognition judgment has likely
occurred (i.e., long cue lag condition). In contrast, lagged cues may still exert an influence if
presented before a covert judgment has been reached (i.e., short or medium cue lag conditions).
Results revealed that participants were not able to ignore reliable environmental cues,
despite being presented after the recognition probe. While criteria shifted to a lesser degree
during ignore relative to use instructions, large shifts were still observed during ignore
instructions. Thus, clear cue influences were present in the decision bias measure during post
cueing. However, the size of this effect was not dependent upon the lag with similar induced
shifts in C (and C') across lags. This insensitivity was also mirrored in the reaction time of the
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old/new judgments under ignore instructions. Although responding was reliably quicker when it
was consistent with the cue, this effect was also insensitive to the lag manipulation.
These initial results demonstrated a robust cue influence under ignore instructions but
they were not consistent with the expectancy model because they were not modulated by the lag
manipulation. However, further analyses of confidence and confidence reaction time did yield
some support for the expectancy account. Specifically, the influence of cues diminished at longer
cue lags particularly for correct rejections, and this diminished influence was mostly driven by
invalid cues. That is, invalid cues tended to reliably diminish confidence and slow the reporting
of confidence at the short lag, with this effect lessening with increased cue lags. Additionally, I
just briefly want to note that prior work has demonstrated that cues more heavily affect correct
rejection as opposed to hit confidence (for more details please see Jaeger, Cox, & Dobbins,
2012a) and therefore it is not necessarily surprising that in the current study the influence of cues
was larger for correct rejections.
Overall the results indicate an effect of cueing even when it occurs after probe
presentation, and this effect is sensitive to the timing of the cue when measured by introspective
reports of confidence. Nonetheless, it is unclear why participants could not fully ignore cues at
long cue lags if the expectancy account is correct because these cues appeared after the majority
of recognition decisions should have been completed based on individually titrated reaction
times from the first test cycle. If one takes the presence of lag effects in the confidence rating
data, and the presence of an overall effect in the old/new criterion, as supportive of the
expectancy account, then it must be concluded that subjects did not fully commit to a judgment
on a large majority of trials even during the longest lag. That is, participants know that reliable
information will be presented and, despite the instructions to ignore it, they may not fully
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commit to a decision until they are explicitly prompted allowing the cue to still exert an
influence. It is perhaps important to note that this problem cannot be addressed by having the
participants commit an explicit initial decision prior to the cue’s appearance, since it would then
be trivial for them not to alter the overt judgment. Indeed, altering the initial judgment even if
given a possibility to do so would simply mean they failed to understand the instruction to
ignore the cue. Given this, future experiments may benefit from encouraging rapid covert
judgments with interspersed trials during which participants were unexpectedly prompted to
make a very quick recognition judgment before any cue was presented. Additionally, the failure
to do so would result in a negative consequence (e.g., long time out with blank screen). Using
this manipulation, participants would presumably learn to commit covertly to judgments early
on in order to prevent the negative experience of a time out and lag effects might then spread to
the old/new judgments as well as being reflected in the secondary confidence judgment data.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 2
Participants’ decision criteria were clearly affected by predictive environmental cues
even when they were instructed to ignore them. However, it is currently unclear whether
participants have any awareness or insight into the fact that their responses are being somehow
influenced despite their efforts to ignore the cues. The above interpretation of an automatic cue
influence may blur a distinction between an influence that is automatic and implicit versus one
that may occur largely automatically, but of which one may have awareness ex post facto. This
distinction is potentially important since one can attempt to correct an influence after it has
occurred by taking some form of a countermanding strategy. Thus, although automatic processes
have been described as unconscious or occurring outside of observer’s explicit awareness
(Posner & Snyder, 1975), this does not mean that observer’s cannot become aware of an
automatic influence after it has occurred. For example, during the Stroop (1935) Task the
mistake of accidentally responding red when seeing the word RED in blue ink may become
incredibly obvious after it has occurred. This is a case where there is an automatic influence, but
also ex post facto awareness of that influence. Although the prior work and current findings
converge in suggesting that the cues automatically bias recognition judgments to some extent, I
currently have not applied the most direct test of whether or not observers are completely
unaware of this influence. For example, observers may be automatically influenced by the cues
and then attempt to correct for this influence by altering their response strategy. Under this
account the observed criterion shifts during ignore instructions would not reflect an entirely
implicit biasing process, but would instead reflect the fact that the observers’ correction
strategies underestimated the degree of initial influence or were somehow otherwise ineffective.
	
  

53	
  

	
  
This distinction might be possible to detect if one examined the awareness of potential cue
influence more directly. To do this, Experiment 2 directly asked participants to rate the degree to
which they felt they might have been influenced by the cues during both use and ignore
instructions. If participants demonstrate awareness of the cues’ influence a positive relationship
should be observed such that as cue influence ratings increase, shifts in bias between Likely Old
and Likely New cued trials should also increase. In contrast, if participants were unaware of the
cues’ influence, then they would not report being influenced even when reliable cue-induced
shifts were occurring.
Additionally, in the current experiment a secondary question was whether individual
differences in criterion regulation are related to measures of cognitive control. Despite the
assumption in the literature that criterion regulation is controlled, very little work has actually
tested whether a relationship exists between adaptive recognition biases and measures of
cognitive control (but see Dobbins & Kroll, 2005) and prior work does not examine whether
individual differences in criterion regulation are related to measures of cognitive control (but see
Konkel, Selmeczy, and Dobbins, 2014). Thus, the current experiment also assessed whether
individual differences in criterion shifting were related to measures of attentional control (i.e.,
working memory) when participants were intentionally or unintentionally biasing their
responding. Cognitive control was assessed using a working memory or complex span task, since
complex span tasks are highly valid and reliable measure of working memory and predict
performance on a whole host of higher order cognitive tasks (Engle & Kane, 2004; Engle, Kane,
& Tuholski, 1999a; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999b). Additionally, a complex
span task requires maintaining and updating relevant information and this may tap similar
processes that occur during criterion regulation such as maintaining and shifting between
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multiple criterion locations and jointly considering two sources of information (cue and memory
based) during judgments. Thus, if criterion regulation is a controlled process then a relationship
may be observed between individual differences in the ability to capitalize on environmental
cues and complex span performance during use instructions. Critically, while working memory
plays an important role in maintaining goals or strategies, it is thought to be particularly
important for maintaining goals while inhibiting interfering responses (Engle, 2002; Engle et al.,
1999a; Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). In the case of the
cueing paradigm, when participants are instructed to ignore cues they may have to engage in
controlled processes to inhibit the automatic response associated with the cue (e.g. respond ‘old’
when see Likely Old cue), and instead focus on responding based on their own internal memory
evidence. If this is the case then complex span may not only be associated with individual
differences in the ability to capitalize on external cues, and/but also with individual differences
in the ability to suppress cues.

3.1 Methods
Participants. Experiment 2 included 25 participants recruited from the Washington University
Experimetrix pool (average age=19.32, 13 females) who were paid $10 or given one course
credit per hour of participation. All participants provided informed consent in accordance with
the University’s review board.
Materials and Procedure. The software and word list used were the same as in Experiment 1.
An additional OSPAN task was implemented using E-prime (Psychology Software Tools;
www.pstnet.com) during which responses were made via mouse click.
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Participants completed a total of 4 study/test cycles and were encouraged to take a brief
break between each study/test cycle. During study participants performed a syllable counting
task (i.e., does this word contain 1, 2, 3 or more syllables?) on a list of serially presented words
(75 items). Immediately after study, participants completed a recognition test where they
indicated whether the word presented was ‘old’ (previously studied) or ‘new’ (not previously
encountered in the experiment) (75 old items, 75 new items). The majority of test trials were
preceded by a 75% reliable cue (referred to as hints to the participants) reading Likely Old or
Likely New that appeared 1 second prior to the recognition probe (120 cued items-60 old, 60
new), while other trials were uncued or baseline trials (30 uncued/baseline items-15 old, 15 new).
Participants were explicitly informed about the reliability of the cue. For the first and third
study/test cycles participants were instructed to use cues, while during the second and fourth
study/test cycles participants were instructed to ignore cues. The order of use vs. ignore
instructions was fixed such that participants’ initial experience was to actively use the cues. This
was done to help illustrate the utility of the cues before having them attempt to ignore them. In
contrast to the prior experiment where participants made confidence judgments, they instead
provided a subjective cue influence rating using a 6-point scale ranging from 1-6 with the verbal
anchors “not at all” placed at the 1 value and “completely” placed at the 6 value.
When instructed to use cues instructions read:
“You will be asked to make a rating about how much your response was influenced by
the hint. For example, the hints can influence your old/new response or the speed of
confidence of your decision.”
When instructed to ignore cues instructions read:
“Even though you are not to use the hints at all, you may accidentally be influenced. For
example, the hint may accidentally influence the speed or confidence of your response.
Additionally, you might respond old or new to an item and only then realize after the fact
that you may have been influenced by the hint...Please try and rate your degree of
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influence as accurately as possible and indicate anytime the hint may have accidentally
influenced any aspect of your response. However, if you are not at all influenced by the
hint then go ahead and rate your response as not at all influenced.”
After recognition testing, participants completed the automated operation span (OSPAN)
task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). During this task participants solved a series of
simple math problems while trying to remember an unrelated set of letters. Participants were
presented with a math equation (e.g., 2 + 5=?) followed by a number (e.g., 8), and indicated
whether the number is the true or a false solution to the given math equation. Immediately after
this, a single letter (e.g., H) was presented for participants to memorize. After a set of these trials
varying in length (3-7), participants recalled the presented letters in correct order. Participants
initially completed a practice phase and final scores were determined by summing all the
perfectly recalled sets (for more details please see Unsworth et al., 2005).
	
  
3.2 Results and Discussion
Two participants only completed a single ignore study/test cycle due to a computer shut
down. One participant’s data were excluded due to near chance performance during
baseline/uncued performance (d’<0.13) suggesting that he/she was not engaged during the
encoding task, leaving 24 participants for analyses. However, removing this participant did not
change any overall findings.
Additionally, as a warning to the reader in the current and several following experiments
standard ANOVA analyses are conducted since they are conventionally used and easy to
interpret. However, a mixed level modeling approach was also used for certain targeted
questions for several reasons later outlined in the results section.

	
  

57	
  

	
  
Criterion. See Table 5 for descriptive statistics for response rates, accuracy, and criteria.
Changes in criteria were assessed with Signal Detection measure C using a 2 X 2 repeated
measures ANOVA with factors of instruction (use vs. ignore) and cue type (Likely Old vs.
Likely New). Results revealed no main effect of instruction, F(1,23)=0.01, p=.91, ηp=.00,
suggesting overall criteria did not change as a function of use vs. ignore instructions. The main
effect of cue type was significant, F(1,23)=69.92, p<.001, ηp=.75, with participants responding
more liberally under Likely Old vs. Likely New cues (-0.52 vs. 0.52). However, these main
effects were conditioned by a significant interaction between instruction and cue type,
F(1,23)=9.15, p=.006, ηp=.28. Follow up post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) revealed a significant
difference between Likely Old and Likely New cues during use instructions (-0.62 vs. 0.61,
p<.001). During ignore instructions, this difference between Likely Old vs. Likely New cues was
smaller but also highly significant (-0.42 vs. 0.42, p<.001). Thus, once again participants were
not able to completely eliminate the influence of external cues when instructed to do so.
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Table 5. Average response rates, accuracy, and criterion with standard deviations in
parenthesis (Experiment 2)
	
  

Use Instructions
HR

CR

d'

C

Uncued/Baseline

0.74

(0.12)

0.72

(0.14)

1.33

(0.6)

-0.03

(0.31)

Cued

0.79

(0.07)

0.79

(0.1)

1.68

(0.44)

0.00

(0.22)

Likely Old Cue

0.87

(0.07)

0.49

(0.2)

1.20

(0.59)

-0.62

(0.4)

Likely New Cue

0.55

(0.21)

0.88

(0.09)

1.49

(0.62)

0.61

(0.5)

Ignore Instructions
HR

CR

d'

C

Uncued/Baseline

0.71

(0.11)

0.71

(0.15)

1.16

(0.49)

0.00

(0.32)

Cued

0.76

(0.09)

0.77

(0.13)

1.55

(0.52)

0.02

(0.29)

Likely Old Cue

0.82

(0.09)

0.57

(0.23)

1.20

(0.59)

-0.42

(0.51)

Likely New Cue

0.59

(0.19)

0.83

(0.13)

1.33

(0.66)

0.42

(0.43)
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Subjective Cue Influence Ratings. The main purpose of the current experiment was to assess
whether participants were subjectively aware that their responses were influenced by cues even
when they were attempting to ignore them. Two separate sets of analysis were conducted on the
self-reported cue influence ratings. The first analysis simply examined average subjective cue
influence ratings across instructions, cue types, and outcomes. The second analysis examined my
targeted question, which was whether participants’ could subjectively rate the degree of cue
influence on a trial wise basis.

Average Cue Influence Ratings
This first analysis assessed which factors contributed to participants’ subjective cue
influence ratings. For ease of interpretation, separate analyses were conducted for use vs. ignore
instructions. Starting with use instructions, influence ratings were assessed using a 2 X 2 X 2
repeated measures ANOVA with factors of cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New), item status
(old vs. new), and response (‘old’ vs. ‘new’). Critically, the three way interaction between cue
type, item status, and response was significant, F(1,22)=7.80, p=.01, ηp=.26 and therefore lower
order interactions will not be reported. The top panels of Figure 8 demonstrate the significant
three-way interaction. Focusing on the left-hand panel when participants’ response was ‘old’,
influence ratings were higher when the cue was Likely Old vs. Likely New. In other words,
influence ratings were higher when the cue and participants’ response aligned, and this was true
when the actual item status was old (i.e., hits) represented in dark gray as well as when the actual
item status was new (i.e., false alarms) represented in light gray. When focusing on the righthand panel when participants’ response was ‘new’, influence ratings were higher when the cue
was Likely New vs. Likely Old. Once again, influence ratings were higher when the cue and

	
  

60	
  

	
  
participant’s response aligned, and this was true when the actual item status was new (i.e.,
correct rejections) represented in light gray as well as when the actual item status was old (i.e.,
misses) represented in dark gray. The three-way interaction was likely significant due to the
influence of cues being slightly larger for new items when the participant responds ‘old’ (i.e.,
false alarms). Thus, overall cues were subjectively rated as more influential when they cue
aligned with participants’ responses.
Turning to ignore instructions, the 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of
cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New), item status (old vs. new), and response (‘old’ vs. ‘new’)
did not reveal a significant 3-way interaction, F(1,23)=1.03, p=.32, ηp=.04. However, comparing
the bottom panels to the top panels of Figure 8 demonstrates that the pattern between use and
ignore instructions was qualitatively similar. Namely, participants reported higher influence
ratings when the cue aligned with their response and this pattern was the same for old as well as
new items. Additionally, when comparing the top and bottom panels it is clear that influence
ratings on average were lower during ignore relative to use instructions. This is consistent with
the criteria analyses that demonstrated participants were less influenced by cues during ignore
instructions. Since the 3-way interaction was not significant, the 2-way interactions are reported
separately. Critically, the 2-way interaction between cue type and response was significant,
F(1,23)=16.23, p<.001, ηp=.41. Post-hoc (Tukey’s HSD) demonstrated that for ‘old’ responses
influence ratings were higher under Likely Old vs. Likely New cues and this effect approached
significance (2.19 vs. 1.42, p=.09). For ‘new’ responses influence ratings were significantly
higher under Likely New vs. Likely Old cues (2.21 vs. 1.33, p=.05). Once again, these results
demonstrate that participants rated higher influence of cues when the cue aligned with their
response. The interaction between cue type and item status was also significant, F(1,23)=12.28,
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p=.001, ηp=.35. Post-hoc (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that for old items influence ratings were
higher under Likely New relative to Likely Old cues and this effect approached significance
(1.80 vs. 1.64, p=.06). For new items, influence ratings were numerically higher under Likely
Old relative to Likely New cues but this effect was not significant (1.89 vs. 1.74, p=.13). This
result demonstrates that within a particular item type, influence ratings were slightly higher when
the cue and item type did not match. Finally, the interaction between item status and response
was also significant, F(1,23)=17.96, p<.001, ηp=.44. Post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that
for old items participants’ influence ratings were significantly higher when participants
responded ‘new’ vs. ‘old’ (1.88 vs. 1.55, p=.001). For new items participants’ influence ratings
were not significantly different when they responded ‘old’ vs. ‘new’ (1.88 vs. 1.75, p=.36).
In summary, subjective ratings of cue influence were heavily affected by response
outcomes such that participants reported being more influenced by cues when the cue aligned
with their responses as opposed to when the cue disagreed with their responses. This occurred
under both use and ignore instructions, although the effect was smaller under ignore instructions.
Potential explanations for this effect will be further elaborated in the discussion section.
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Use Instructions
Old Item
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New Item

Said Old

Said New

Influence Rating

4
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Likely Old

Likely New

Likely Old

Likely New

Ignore Instructions
Old Item

5

New Item

Said Old

Said New

Influence Rating

4
3
2
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Likely Old

Likely New

Likely Old

Likely New

Figure 8. Influence ratings Experiment 2. The graph above depicts influence ratings for old
(dark gray) and new (light gray) items under Likely Old and Likely New cues when
participants responded ‘old’ (right panel) vs. ‘new’ (left panel). The top plots depict use
instruction and the bottom plots depict ignore instructions. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals for the mean.
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Additional Analysis of Cue Influence Ratings
Although the analysis above demonstrated under what conditions individuals on average
report the greatest dependence upon the cues, it did not directly ascertain whether reports of
greater influence actually predicted greater correspondence between the cues and the observer’s
judgments on each trial. To accomplish this, I turned to mixed level modeling (MLM) for several
reasons. First, MLM is robust to situations in which different individuals use different portions of
the scales whereas ANOVA models require case-wise deletion of levels in which not all subjects
provide a response. In this particular case, participants were less likely to use high influence
ratings during ignore instructions and this would have resulted in a substantially large number of
case-wise deletions using simple ANOVA models. Second, MLM allows one to model each
individual response at the trial level, providing more powerful approach to test my question of
interest.
Additionally, MLM allows one to jointly model fixed and random effects and to fully
model the nested structure of repeated measure designs. More specifically, in a recognition
paradigm each subject encounters hundreds of old and new test items and thus item types are a
factor that is nested within subjects. Additionally, each subject may vary considerably in both the
tendency towards old or new responses (bias) and the sensitivity to the item type distinction
(accuracy). This type of variability is properly modeled as a random effect since the subjects are
sampled from a larger population that varies in bias and accuracy. To capture this MLM jointly
models the dependent variable as influenced by fixed and random components. This can be
thought of as expanding upon a basic simple regression model (ignoring the nesting of trials
within subjects) including all trial level data where the dependent variable response (coded 1-old,
0-new) is predicted only from a single fixed effect of item status (coded 1-old, 0-new). In this
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case, a significant positive estimate of item status would indicate a higher ‘old’ rate for old vs.
new items, or in other words this estimate captures recognition accuracy. However, each
participant has hundreds of trials contributing to the analysis, and this model does not account for
variability that may be due to participants. In other words, this model assumes a single intercept
and slope of item status for all participants and does not capture any variability between
participants. To account for this, the model could be extended to include random effects such
that variability due to individual differences across participants is appropriately modeled as
explained variance (for more details please see Zuur, Ieno, Walker, Saveliev, & Smith, 2009).
For example, when modeling participant as random intercept the intercept is allowed to vary
across participants. This means the baseline probability of responding ‘old’ when item status is 0
(i.e., new) is allowed to vary across individuals, reflecting individual differences in response bias.
Additionally, a random slope component can also be included allowing the slope of item status to
vary across participants. This means the relationship between response and item status is also
allowed to vary across participants, reflecting individual differences in response accuracy. Thus,
a mixed level model predicting response using a fixed effect of item status, random intercept of
participant, and random slope of item status allows one to assess the effect of item status while
appropriately accounting for variance due to individual differences in response bias and accuracy
(see Wright, Horry, & Skagerberg, 2009 for more details). Importantly, this simple model can be
extended to assess the fixed effects of other variables, as I outline below.
All mixed level modeling was done with R (version 3.1.0) using the lme4 package
(version 1.0-4). MLM was done using linear probability models since they provide solutions that
are very close to those of logistic regression and provide easily interpretable parameters (i.e.,
they indicate how the variables influence the probability of response). Using a linear probability
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model I predicted response (coded 1-old, 0-new), using the fixed effects item status (coded 1-old,
0-new), instruction (coded 1-use, 0-ignore), cue type (coded 1-Likely Old, 0-Likely New), and
cue influence rating (ranging from 1-6). Additionally, a random intercept and slope component
was included such that the intercept and slope of items status was allowed to vary across
participants in order to account for individual differences in response bias (i.e., the probability of
responding ‘old’) and accuracy respectively (Wright et al., 2009). Initially the full model was fit
including all main effects and interactions. The final model was determined by systematically
removing the highest order interactions until there was a significant decrease in fit using chisquared tests of log-likelihoods. Interactions at the same level were removed in order of least to
most significant. Coefficient estimates were tested using the Satterthwaite approximation for
degrees of freedom.
The full model included all possible main effects and interactions using item status,
instruction, cue, and cue influence rating. Removing the 4-way interaction did not significantly
reduce fit 𝜒2(1)=0.01, p=.91. Removing the 3-way interactions item status by cue by instruction
as well as item status by cue by influence did not significantly reduce fit, ps>.51. However,
removing the 3-way interaction item status by influence by instructions significantly reduced fit
𝜒2(1)=3.72, p=.05. The final model is reported in Table 6.
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Table 6. Final mixed level model (Experiment 2)
	
  
Random Effects:
Groups-Subjects

Variance St. Dev.

(Intercept)

0.01

0.11

Item Status

0.01

0.12

Correlation

-0.83

Fixed Effects:
Estimate Std. Error

df

t

p-value

(Intercept)

0.29

0.03

42

11.06

<.001***

Item Status

0.58

0.03

60

18.04

<.001***

Cue Type

-0.09

0.02

11224

-4.72

<.001***

Influence

-0.06

0.01

10318

-10.15

<.001***

Instruction

0.04

0.02

11231

1.76

0.08

Item Status x Cue Type

0.00

0.02

11220

0.31

0.75

Item Status x Influence

-0.10

0.01

9160

-11.60

<.001***

Cue Type x Influence

0.19

0.01

11225

23.80

<.001***

Item Status x Instruction

0.14

0.03

11226

4.89

<.001***

Cue Type x Instruction

-0.16

0.03

11223

-5.81

<.001***

Influence x Instruction

0.00

0.01

11139

0.28

0.78

Item Status x Influence x Instruction

-0.02

0.01

11035

-1.93

0.05*

Cue Type x Influence x Instruction

0.02

0.01

11225

2.14

0.03*

*** p<.001

	
  

** p<.01

* p<.05
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While both the significant higher order interactions included instruction, separate models
were estimated under use and ignore instructions in order to more easily interpret the results.
Under use instructions MLM was estimated using main effects and interactions of item status by
cue influence rating and cue type by cue influence rating (see Table 7). The top panel in Figure 9
shows the cue type by influence interaction demonstrating that as cue influence ratings increased
the probability of responding ‘old’ increased under Likely Old cues and decreased under Likely
New cues. Thus, the influence of cues was more robust as subjective ratings of cue influence
increased, suggesting that under use instructions participants could subjectively monitor their
degrees of influence. The bottom panel shows the influence rating by item status interaction
demonstrating that as cue influence ratings increased the probability of responding ‘old’
decreased for old items and increased for new items. That is, as cue influence ratings increased
the probability of responding old approached 0.5 or guessing. This suggests that participants
gave higher subjective ratings of cue influence as their memory evidence or accuracy weakened.
The analogous model for ignore instructions revealed a similar pattern (see Table 8). The
top panel in Figure 10 shows the cue type by influence interaction once again demonstrating that
the influence of cues were more robust as subjective ratings of cue influence increased. Recall
that in the original model there was a significant interaction between cue type, influence, and
instruction, p=0.03. This three-way interaction was likely driven by the steeper slope of Likely
New cues during ignore (top panel of Figure 10) relative to use instructions (top panel of Figure
9). Critically, however, even when participants were actively attempting to ignore cues they were
able to subjectively monitor their degree of cue influence. Thus, although participants were not
able to override the influence of cues, they appeared to have awareness of their influence. The
bottom panel shows the item status by influence rating interaction demonstrating that as cue
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influence ratings increased the probability of responding ‘old’ decreased for old items while it
remained relatively stable for new items. Thus, once again participants rated higher influence of
cues as their probability of responding old approached guessing (i.e., .50) but this effect seems to
be mostly driven by old items while new items remained largely unaffected. Note, however, that
during ignore instructions participants were less likely to give high cue influence ratings
resulting in less reliable estimates for these high ratings. This can also be observed by the
increased size of confidence bands for higher values of cue influence ratings. Additionally, recall
that in the original model there was a significant interaction between item status, influence, and
instruction, p=0.05. This three-way interaction was likely driven by the relatively flat slope of
new items during ignore instructions (bottom panel of Figure 10) compared to positive slope
under use instructions (bottom panel of Figure 9).
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Table 7. Separate mixed level model for use instructions (Experiment 2)
	
  

Use Instructions
Random Effects:
Groups-Subjects

Variance

St. Dev.

Correlation

(Intercept)

0.00

0.08

Item Status

0.01

0.10 -0.80

Fixed Effects:
Estimate

Std. Error

df

t

p-value

(Intercept)

0.32

0.02

65

13.45

<.001***

Item Status

0.74

0.03

76

23.73

<.001***

Cue Type

-0.25

0.02

5728 -11.56

<.001***

Influence

-0.06

0.00

4193 -13.44

<.001***

Item Status x Cue Type

0.00

0.02

5712

Items Status x Influence

-0.13

0.01

3952 -21.31

<.001***

Cue Type x Influence

0.21

0.01

5728

<.001***

	
  

70	
  

0.14

39.06

0.89

	
  
Table 8. Separate mixed level model for ignore instructions (Experiment 2)
	
  
Ignore Instructions
Random Effects:
Groups-Subjects

Variance St. Dev.

(Intercept)

0.02

0.14

Item Status

0.02

0.15

Correlation

-0.85

Fixed Effects:
Estimate Std. Error

df

t

p-value

(Intercept)

0.33

0.03

35

9.60 <.001***

Item Status

0.55

0.04

51

13.84 <.001***

Cue Type

-0.10

0.02

5472 -4.31 <.001***

Influence

-0.08

0.01

3454 -10.54 <.001***

Item Status x Cue Type

0.01

0.02

5466 0.37

Items Status x Influence

-0.09

0.01

1899 -8.23 <.001***

Cue Type x Influence

0.19

0.01

5476 22.42 <.001***

*** p<.001

	
  

** p<.01

* p<.05
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Figure 9. Mixed level model use instructions Experiment 2. The top panel shows the cue
type by influence ratings interaction and the bottom panel depicts the influence rating by
item status interaction. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 10. Mixed level model ignore instructions Experiment 2. The top panel shows the cue
type by influence ratings interaction and the bottom panel depicts the influence rating by
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Working Memory. Recall that a secondary question of the current experiment was whether
individual differences in criteria shifts were linked to measures of cognitive control, namely
working memory. Participants’ working memory was estimated using a traditional absolute
OSPAN score, which is the sum of all the perfectly recalled sets (Unsworth et al., 2005). Table 9
shows the simple correlations between OSPAN scores, shifts in response criterion, and baseline
accuracy. When examining Table 9, it is clear that OSPAN scores did not correlate significantly
with criterion swing (measured as the difference between criterion measure (C) under Likely
New minus Likely Old cues) or uncued/baseline accuracy measures. However, to control for
differences in uncued/baseline accuracy, I also conducted hierarchical regression analyses
predicting shifts in response criterion using baseline/uncued accuracy in Step 1 as a covariate and
adding OSPAN scores in Step 2, separately for both use and ignore instructions. For use
instructions, Step 1 revealed a significant negative relationship between criterion swing and
uncued/baseline performance, b=-0.50, t(22)=-2.24, p=.04, suggesting that those with higher
uncued/baseline accuracy had smaller shifts in response criterion. This result was not unexpected,
since theoretically those individuals who have higher baseline performance have less room to
benefit from environmental cues, and they should shift their response criterion to a lesser degree
(see Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). Critically, when adding OSPAN score as a predictor in Step 2,
it was not significant, ΔR2=0.05, F(1,21)=1.40, p=.25; b=0.00, t(21)=1.18, p=.24.
For ignore instructions, in Step 1 uncued/baseline performance was not a significant
predictor of criterion swing, b=-0.41, t(22)=-1.49, p=.15. Thus, it appears as though when
participants were actively trying to eliminate the influence of cues, there was not a strong
relationship between criterion swing and uncued/baseline performance. Critically, once again
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when adding OSPAN score as a predictor in Step 2, it was not significant, ΔR2=0.06,
F(1,21)=1.51 p=.23; b=0.01, t(21)=1.23, p=.23. However, as seen in Table 9 the degree of
criterion shift between use and ignore instructions was highly correlated (r=0.57) and it could be
the case that when participants were instructed to ignore cues they attempted to lessen their cue
influence relative to their swing under use instructions. Therefore, another regression was run
predicting shifts in criterion during ignore instructions while controlling for shifts in criterion
under use instructions. In Step 1 uncued/baseline performance was not a significant predictor of
criterion swing, b=-0.28, t(21)=-1.17, p=.25. Additionally, criterion swing under use instructions
was also included in Step 1 and as expected it was a significant predictor, b=0.52, t(21)=3.00,
p=.006. Critically, when adding OSPAN score as a predictor in Step 2, it was not significant,
ΔR2=0.02, F(1,20)=0.46, p=.51; b=0.00, t(20)=0.68, p=.50. Overall, in the current experiment
working memory does not appear to be related to the degree of criterion shift observed from
environmental cues for both use or ignore instructions. However, the failure to detect a
relationship could result from the limited power of the current individual differences analysis and
this issue will be further examined in the General Discussion section.
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Table 9. Simple correlations between OSPAN scores, baseline accuracy, and criterion
swing (Experiment 2)
	
  

	
  

	
  
OSPAN
Score

Use Baseline
Accuracy

Use Criterion Ignore Baseline
Swing
Accuracy

OSPAN Score
Use Baseline Accuracy

0.14

Use Criterion Swing

0.16

-0.43*

Ignore Baseline Accuracy

0.37

0.50*

-0.18

Ignore Criterion Swing

0.12

-0.20

0.57**

*** p<.001

** p<.01

* p<.05
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-0.30

	
  
3.3 Discussion
	
  

Experiment 2 investigated whether observers could subjectively rate their degree of cue

influence on a trial-by-trial basis. While previous experiments demonstrated participants could
not fully ignore environmental cues when instructed to do so, it was unclear whether participants
were aware of this putatively automatic cue influence. The current experiment assessed
participants’ awareness of cue influence by having them complete a cue influence rating after
each cued recognition test trial. As expected, participants were not able to fully eliminate the
influence of cues during ignore instruction and still responded more liberally under Likely Old vs.
Likely New cues. Once again this effect was dampened relative to use instructions. Furthermore,
mixed level modeling revealed that as the influence of cues increased (measured as the
difference in the probability of responding ‘old’ under Likely Old vs. Likely new cues)
subjective ratings of cue influence also increased. This occurred under both use and ignore cue
instructions, suggesting that even during ignore instructions participants had some level of
awareness that they were influenced. Additionally, participants were also more likely to have
higher cue influence ratings when the cue aligned with their response (e.g., ‘old’ response under
Likely Old cue) relative to when the cue disagreed with their response (e.g., ‘old’ response under
Likely New cue).
Under the previously described expectancy based hypothesis, cues are thought to alter the
subjective experience of evoked memory signal and the current experiment suggests that
observers have awareness of this influence ex post facto. Thus, observed criterion shifts during
ignore instructions may not reflect an entirely implicit biasing process, but instead participants’
correction strategies may have been inefficient or they may have underestimated the degree of
initial influence. That is, environmental cues may have exerted a large degree of initial influence
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and when participants were instructed to ignore cues they may have used some form of
countermanding strategy to try and correct for this influence. The fact that participants were not
able to fully eliminate the influence suggests an inefficient use of this strategy or participants
may have underestimated their initial degree of influence. Importantly, the finding that
participants were aware of the influence of cues suggests that there could be circumstances
where perhaps participants may be more efficient at overcoming the influence of environmental
cues, and the results from Experiments 3 and 4 suggests this may be the case.
Additionally, participants also gave higher ratings of cue influence when the cue matched
their old/new response. This result could reflect a post-recognition judgment heuristic such that
regardless of the true influence of cues, when participants overtly disagreed with a cue they
indicated a low degree of influence to appear consistent or reasonable (i.e., it may appear
inconsistent for participants to be highly influenced by a cue that they disagreed with). Thus, in
this case influence ratings would reflect the degree of agreement participants felt between the cue
and their judgment. However, it is unlikely that participants’ cue influence ratings were solely
based on the match between the cue form and their judgment since subjective ratings of
influence were related to the actual degree of cue influence as measured by the change in
response rates. Alternatively, participants could also have used a pre-recognition judgment
heuristic where influence ratings were linked to the quality of memory evidence recovered.
Recall that the degree of cue influence was also associated with accuracy such that participants
rated higher degrees of cue influence when their probability of responding ‘old’ approached 0.5
or guessing. Therefore, it could also be the case that participants appropriately assessed their
quality of memory evidence and when memory evidence was weak they rated a higher degree of
cue influence than when memory evidence was strong. Under this account, cue influence ratings
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reflect the degree to which participants depended on the cue. Furthermore, the reason cue
influence ratings would be higher when participants’ responses aligned with the cue is because
these trials contained a large proportion of instances where participants actually changed the
original judgment in favor of the cue’s recommendation. In other words, if participants changed
their judgment to align with the cue when memory evidence was weak, then they would more
frequently agree with the cue while also giving higher ratings of cue influence. If participants
kept their initial judgment when memory evidence was strong, then they would more frequently
disagree with the cue while also giving lower ratings of cue influence.
Finally, the current experiment also assessed whether individual differences in criterion
shifting were linked to working memory ability. However, no relationship was found between
working memory scores and criterion shifting during both use or ignore cue instructions. While
this seems to suggest that cognitive control, at least measured by working memory span, may not
be particularly important at predicting criterion regulation, the current experiment may have been
underpowered to detect this relationship. A more complete discussion of this topic will occur in
the General Discussion.
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Chapter 4
Experiment 3
The prior work assessing whether participants can eliminate the influence of
environmental cues always used reliable (i.e., 75% valid) cues. Although this work shows that
participants cannot separate the influence of reliable cues from internal memory evidence, the
current study examined whether participants can ignore random, uninformative cues. If the
automatic influence of cues is due to learned expectancies (i.e., the cue becomes associated with
an anticipation of experiencing familiarity or novelty and this in turn alters the processing of the
memory signal), then reliable cues may be particularly difficult to ignore since the cues are
positively correlated with item status (see Melara & Algom, 2003 for similar ideas using Stroop
Task). However, random cues are uninformative since they are not correlated with item status so
learned expectancies cannot form. Therefore, under an expectancy based account participants
should easily ignore random cues. Alternatively, if the automatic influence of cues is instead
driven by strategies or heuristics, participants’ decision criteria may still be influenced even
when provided with random cues. For example, previous memory conformity research shows
that when two speakers recalled an event, participants were more likely to rate the first speaker
as more confident and accurate even when participants were explicitly told the first speaker was
picked at random (Wright & Carlucci, 2011). This result suggests that even when information is
uninformative, heuristics could still influence how people use this information. Additionally,
although Experiment 2 did not find a relationship between working memory and criterion
shifting in the context of reliable cues, the current experiment assessed whether working memory
may be linked to the ability to effectively disregard random cues.
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4.1 Methods
Participants. Experiment 3 included 31 participants recruited from the Washington University
Experimetrix pool (average age=19.73, 23 females; one participant chose not to report age and
sex) who were given one course credit per hour of participation. All participants provided
informed consent in accordance with the University’s review board.
Materials and Procedure. The software and word list used were the same as in Experiment 2.
Participants completed a total of 3 study/test cycles and were encouraged to take a brief
break between each study/test cycle. During study participants performed a syllable counting
task (i.e., does this word contain 1, 2, 3 or more syllables?) on a list of serially presented words
(106 items). Immediately after study, participants completed a recognition test where they
indicated whether the word presented was ‘old’ (previously studied) or ‘new’ (not previously
encountered in the experiment) (106 old items, 106 new items). The majority of test trials were
preceded by a cue reading Likely Old or Likely New that appeared 1 second prior to the
recognition probe (192 cued items-96 old, 96 new). Half the cued trials were preceded by a
random (50%) cue (96 items-48 valid, 48 invalid), while the other half were preceded by a
reliable (75%) cue (96 items-72 valid, 24 invalid). Some items were also were also uncued (20
uncued/baseline items-10 old, 10 new) and all trials were randomly intermixed. Participants were
explicitly informed about the reliability of the cue using the following instructions:
“Some cues will be reliable and correct 75% of the time. This means about 7 out of 10
times the cue will give you the correct answer and should be generally helpful for your
recognition judgment. Other cues will be random and correct only 50% of the time. This
means 5 out of 10 times the cue will give you the correct answer and is not helpful for
your recognition judgment.”
To distinguish between the two cue reliabilities random cues were presented in blue font and
included the word ‘random’ (e.g., Random Likely Old) and reliable cues were presented in
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yellow font and included the word ‘reliable’ (e.g., Reliable Likely New). For the first study/test
cycle participants were encouraged to incorporate cues using the following instructions:
“Overall your goal should be to respond as accurately as possible using the combination
of your own memory evidence and cues.”
In the current design the words USE CUES were not presented throughout the test cycle since
random and reliable cues were intermixed and I did not want to encourage participants to
explicitly use random cues. During the second and third study/test cycle, participants were told to
ignore cues using the following instructions:
“You should IGNORE THE CUES and make your decision solely on your own memory.
Although some of the cues are helpful, you should ignore any cue presented.”
For the ignore study/test cycles, the words IGNORE CUES were presented on the screen using
red font since the goal of the participant should be to ignore all cues. After each recognition
decision, participants made a confidence rating using a 6-point scale ranging from 50%-100% in
10% increments with 50% indicating guessing and 100% indicating certainty. At the end of
recognition testing participants were asked whether the reliable cues were accurate
approximately 75% of the time and whether the random cues were accurate approximately 50%
of the time using a Yes/No response. If participants responded ‘No’, a follow up question asked
them to indicate how accurate they thought the cue was using a percentage. These questions were
asked in order to evaluate whether participants believed the instructions regarding cue validity.
After the recognition tests participants also completed the OSPAN task using the same methods
as described in Experiment 2 in order to assess whether working memory is linked to the ability
to prevent the influence of random cues.
	
  
4.2 Results and Discussion
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As a reminder standard ANOVA analyses were conducted since they are conventionally used
and easy to interpret. However, a mixed level modeling approach was also used for certain
targeted questions outlined in the results section.
Criterion. See Table 10 for descriptive statistics response rates, accuracy, and criteria. Please
note that for all tables in the current experiment uncued/baseline measures were estimated
collapsing across use and ignore instructions. This was done in order to increase reliability since
only a low number of uncued/baseline trials were included during each study/test cycle (20
items) in order to keep the experiment length at an appropriate level and maximize the number of
cued trials.
Changes in criteria were assessed with Signal Detection measure C using a three-way
repeated measure ANOVA with factors of instruction (use vs. ignore), cue condition (random vs.
reliable), and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) (See Figure 11). Critically, the three-way
interaction between instruction, cue condition, and cue type, was significant F(1,30)=24.87,
p<.001, ηp=.45 Follow-up interaction analyses separately considered the use and ignore
instruction conditions. During the use instruction there was a significant interaction between cue
type and cue condition, F(1,30)=26.62, p<.001, ηp=.47 that resulted because criterion differed
during Likely Old and Likely New cues when they were reliable (-0.36 vs. 0.34, p<.001) but not
when they were random (-0.04 vs. 0.02, p=.87). In contrast, during ignore instructions cue type
and cue condition did not interact F(1,30)=0.83, p=.37, ηp=.03 and there were no main effects of
either factor as well (ps>0.07) (See Figure 11). Thus, neither reliable nor random cues induced
significant shifts in criterion under the ignore instructions, contrasting with the prior experiments.
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parenthesis (Experiment 3)
	
  
	
  

Use Instructions
HR

CR

d'

C

Random Cue
Cued

0.76 (0.09) 0.75 (0.11) 1.47 (0.45) 0.00 (0.26)

Likely Old Cue

0.77 (0.11) 0.75 (0.13) 1.56 (0.50) -0.04 (0.38)

Likely New Cue

0.75 (0.13) 0.76 (0.12) 1.49 (0.62) 0.02

(0.3)

Reliable Cue
Cued

0.80 (0.08) 0.80 (0.09) 1.74 (0.38) 0.01 (0.26)

Likely Old Cue

0.85 (0.10) 0.64 (0.20) 1.53 (0.52) -0.36 (0.47)

Likely New Cue

0.64 (0.16) 0.85 (0.09) 1.52 (0.57) 0.34 (0.34)
Ignore Instructions
HR

CR

d'

C

Random Cue
Cued

0.73 (0.12) 0.74 (0.12) 1.37 (0.57) 0.02 (0.30)

Likely Old Cue

0.73 (0.13) 0.74 (0.12) 1.37 (0.60) 0.00 (0.33)

Likely New Cue

0.73 (0.13) 0.74 (0.13) 1.39 (0.63) 0.03 (0.33)

Reliable Cue
Cued

0.73 (0.12) 0.75 (0.14) 1.41 (0.59) 0.04 (0.33)

Likely Old Cue

0.75 (0.12) 0.73 (0.16) 1.42 (0.69) 0.00 (0.36)

Likely New Cue

0.70 (0.13) 0.75 (0.15) 1.36 (0.71) 0.10 (0.35)

HR
Overall Uncued/Baseline

	
  

FA

d'

C

0.75 (0.12) 0.73 (0.15) 1.40 (0.49) -0.02 (0.39)
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Criterion
Likely Old

0.50

Use Cues

Likely New

Ignore Cues

C

0.25
0.00

−0.25
−0.50
Reliable

Random

Reliable

Random

Figure 11. Criterion Experiment 3. The graph depicts average criterion (C) under Likely Old
(black) and Likely New (gray) cues during use and ignore instructions for both reliable and
random cues. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the mean.
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Given the prior experiments it was surprising to find that reliable cues were
effectively ignored when intermixed with random cues in the current study. Therefore, I further
assessed criterion by examining results as function of subjective ratings of cue validity. Recall
that after recognition testing participants were asked whether they found the cues to be 50% and
75% valid using a yes/no response. If they responded ‘no’, they were asked to provide a
subjective percentage estimate of cue validity. Overall, 48% of participants (N=15) reported that
the reliable cues were 75% accurate. Those who reported not believing the reliable cues to be
75% accurate tended to estimate a lower percentage (M=52%, SD=9.99). For random cues, 61%
of participants (N=19) reported that they were 50% accurate, and those who reported not
believing the random cues to be 50% tended to estimate a lower percentage (M=40%, SD=11.43).
To examine whether criterion shifting was related to subjective reports of cue validity, a simple
correlation was conducted between criterion swing scores (Likely New C- Likely Old C) and
subjective percentages of cue validity, with the actual percentages of cue validity (i.e., 75% and
50%) used for those participants who provided a ‘yes’ response. For use instructions, the
correlation was not significant during both reliable (r=.13, p=.52) and random cues (r=-.08,
p=.68). Similarly, for ignore instructions, the correlation was also not significant during both
reliable (r=.30, p=.11) and random cues (r=-.02, p=.92). Thus, subjective estimates of cue
validity did not seem to affect the degree of criterion shifting for both use and ignore instructions.
To summarize, the finding that participants’ decision criteria were not influenced by
random cues supports the expectancy based account such that when cues no longer reliably
engender an expectation of item status, participants were able to effectively ignore them.
However, in contrast to prior experiments, the reliable cues also failed to demonstrate shifts of
the criterion during ignore instructions. However, the standard ANOVA approach does not
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jointly model variance in subject bias and accuracy when assessing cue influences and therefore
mixed level modeling at the trial level was also conducted.
Mixed level Modeling. Although the ANOVA analysis failed to find reliable cue influences
under the ignore instruction, the numerical differences in the mean criterion were in the direction
consistent with a cue influence (reliable cues, right panel Figure 11). Critically, the standard
ANOVA model does not allow one to simultaneously model variation in overall bias and
differences in recognition accuracy across subjects, and this in turn may inflate the error term
reducing power to detect an effect. More specifically, subjects with high baseline accuracy
would not be expected to show much of a cue influence under use or ignore instructions since
even if the cues affected criterion placement or probe processing to a slight degree, it would be
difficult to detect in the response rates. For example, under signal detection theory, an observer
with a d' of 2.5 would only show a change in response percentages of 3.7% for a criterion shift
of .20 standard deviation units away from the unbiased point, whereas an individual with a d' of
1 would show a shift of 7.0% for the same criterion movement. Additionally, overall response
bias will also affect the degree to which response rates change as a function of shifting decision
criteria. One can attempt to control for either subject differences in accuracy or general decision
bias via an ANCOVA, but MLM allows for the joint modeling of both subject effects (bias and
accuracy and their covariance) while estimating the average affect of cues (fixed effect) with
these subject variations controlled.
To address this I turned to mixed level modeling to try to improve the power to detect
effects for reliable cues under the ignore instruction condition. The MLM was restricted to
ignore instructions since the predicted effects were clearly observed under use instructions with
an ANOVA approach (i.e., significant shifts under reliable cues but not random cues) and
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therefore the results from a more powerful MLM approach would simply reaffirm these results.
Restricting analyses to only cued trials during ignore test cycles, response (coded 1-old, 0-new)
was predicted using item status (coded 1-old, 0-new), cue condition (0-random, 1-reliable), and
cue type (coded 1-Likely Old, 0-Likely New). The intercept of the model was treated as a
random effect across subjects as well as the effect of item status. The intercept term captures
subject differences in the propensity towards positive responses (viz., bias) and the item term
captures differences in the degree to which each subjects responses are tightly coupled with the
status of the test probe (viz., accuracy) (Wright et al., 2009). Linear probability models were
used since they provide solutions that are very close to those of logistic regression and provide
easily interpretable parameters (i.e., they indicate how the variables influence the probability of
response). Initially the full model was fit including both main effects and higher order
interactions. The final model was determined by systematically removing predictors starting with
the highest order interaction until there was a significant decrease in fit using chi-squared tests of
log-likelihoods. Interactions at the same level were removed in order of least to most significant.
Coefficient estimates were tested using the Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of freedom.
The full model included both main effects and higher order interactions between item
status, cue condition, and cue type. Removing the three way interaction did not significantly
reduce fit 𝜒2(1)=0.75, p=.39. Removing the two way interactions between item status and cue
type and item status and cue condition also did not significantly reduce fit, ps>0.66. Removing
the two way interaction between cue type and cue condition marginally reduced fit 𝜒2(1)=2.86,
p=.09. Importantly, removing the main effect of cue type significantly reduced fit, 𝜒2(1)=4.89,
p=.03. Thus, the final model (see Table 11) included a significant main effect of item status,
b=0.46 t(30)=16.37, p<.001, which simply reflected accuracy and indicated that participants
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were more likely to respond ‘old’ when the item was old vs. new. Critically, the main effect of
cue type was also significant, b=0.02 t(11840)=2.21, p=.03, indicating that participants
responded ‘old’ more often under Likely Old vs. Likely New cues and demonstrating that
participants did not fully ignore cues. The main effect of cue condition was not significant,
b=0.00 t(11840)=-0.24, p=.81, indicating that overall ‘old’ rates did not differ between random
and reliable cueing conditions.
While removing the interaction between cue condition and cue type was only marginally
significant, p=.09, separate models were conducted for random and reliable cueing conditions.
Under the expectancy account, cue type should not be significant when cues were random since
cue driven expectancies should not form when cues were uninformative. In contrast, cue type
should be a significant predictor for reliable cues since these cues should result in cue driven
expectations. For reliable cues, a MLM was conducted including the main effects and interaction
between item status and cue type. Removing the interaction between item status and cue type did
not significantly reduce fit, 𝜒2(1)=0.89, p=.35. However, removing the main effect of cue type
did significantly reduce fit, 𝜒2(1)=7.18, p=.01. Thus, this significant main effect of cue type,
b=0.03 t(5888)=2.68, p=.01, indicated that participants responded ‘old’ more often under reliable
Likely Old vs. Likely New cues. For random cues, the analogous model revealed no significant
reduction in fit when removing the interaction between item status and cue type 𝜒2(1)=0.06,
p=.80. Critically, the model fit was also not significantly reduced when removing the main effect
of cue type,  𝜒2(1)=0.24, p=.62, suggesting that there was not a significant influence of cue type
on ‘old’ rates when cues were random. Overall, the more powerful MLM approach does suggest
that reliable cues exerted a small influence during ignore instruction, although clearly the effect
was much smaller relative to the previous experiments. More specifically, the linear probability
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model suggested that subjects shifted their 'old' response probability by 3% in the face of the
cues. Additionally, the MLM demonstrates no influence of random cues confirming ANOVA
analyses that participants were able to effectively disregard random cues.
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Table 11. Mixed level model for ignore instructions during reliable cues (Experiment 3)
	
  

	
  

Ignore Instructions
Random Effects:
Groups-Subjects

Variance

St. Dev.

(Intercept)

0.02

0.12

Item Status

0.02

0.15

Correlation

-0.71

Fixed Effects:
Estimate

Std. Error

df

(Intercept)

0.25

0.02

33

10.80 <.001***

Item Status

0.47

0.03

30

16.37 <.001***

Cue Type

0.02

0.01

11840

2.21

0.03*

Cue Condition

0.00

0.01

11840

-0.24

0.81

*** p<.001

	
  

** p<.01

* p<.05
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p-value

	
  
Confidence. The influence of cues during ignore instructions was further assessed using
confidence, which may be a more sensitive indicator of cue influence because it is more finely
grained and potentially more dependent upon introspection. Once again, recall that participants
used a 6-point confidence scale (50-100% in 10% increments) after each recognition decision.
All confidence analyses focused on correct responses (i.e., hits and correct rejections) since
incorrect responses were relatively infrequent and provide much less reliable estimates. While
the main analyses only focused on ignore test cycles, Table 12 and Figure 12 contain descriptive
statistics for confidence under both use and ignore instructions.
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Table 12. Average confidence with standard deviations in parenthesis (Experiment 3)
	
  
	
  

Use Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Random Cue
Likely Old Cue

85.93

(8.05)

77.38

(9.61)

Likely New Cue

85.17

(8.66)

79.85

(9.04)

Likely Old Cue

86.19

(7.60)

76.69

(9.62)

Likely New Cue

85.00

(8.13)

82.57

(7.40)

Reliable Cue

Ignore Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Random Cue
Likely Old Cue

87.95

(8.38)

80.33

(8.32)

Likely New Cue

87.93

(8.92)

80.22

(9.18)

Likely Old Cue

87.91

(7.79)

78.65

(9.52)

Likely New Cue

88.08

(8.72)

80.98

(8.51)

Reliable Cue

Hits
Overall Uncued/Baseline

	
  

86.68
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Correct Rejections
(8.79)

78.59

(8.59)

	
  

Hits
For hits, a 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors condition (random vs. reliable)
and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) was conducted only on the ignore test cycles. However,
the main effects and interaction were not significant (ps>0.82), suggesting the cues did not exert
an influence on hit confidence during ignore instructions (see Figure 12 top right panel).
Correct Rejections
The 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors cue condition (random vs. reliable)
and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) revealed a significant main effect of cue type,
F(1,30)=5.38, p=.03, ηp=.15 due to higher confidence during Likely New vs. Likely Old cues
(80.60 vs. 79.49). The main effect of cue condition was not significant, F(1,30)=1.25, p=.27,
ηp=.04. Critically, the interaction between cue type and cue condition was significant,
F(1,30)=6.72, p=.01, ηp=.18 (see Figure 12 bottom right panel). Post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD)
revealed no effect of random cues (Likely Old 80.33 vs. Likely New 80.22, p=.99); however,
confidence was significantly higher during reliable Likely New vs. Likely Old cued trials (80.98
vs. 78.65, p=.007). Importantly, this result suggests that at the level of confidence, reliable cues
still exerted an influence during ignore instructions.
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Hits
Likely Old

Confidence

100

Use Cues

Likely New

Ignore Cues

90

80

70

Reliable

Random

Reliable

Random

Correct Rejections
Likely Old

Confidence

100

nce under
tructions for
panels depict
mean.

Ignore Cues

90

80

70

	
  

Use Cues

Likely New

Reliable

Random

Reliable

95	
  

Random

	
  

Reaction Time. Like the confidence data, reaction time might also prove to be more sensitive to
the effects of reliable cues. Descriptive statistics for reaction time under both use and ignore
instructions are in Table 13 and Figure 13, but analyses will once again focus on ignore test
cycles. For each participant the medians, as opposed to mean reaction time was used for
estimating reaction time since response time distributions are positively skewed and the median
is less influenced by outliers.
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Use Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Random Cue
Likely Old Cue

2.11

(0.88)

2.13

(0.73)

Likely New Cue

2.05

(0.82)

1.77

(0.62)

Likely Old Cue

1.91

(0.64)

2.13

(0.92)

Likely New Cue

2.36

(1.36)

1.95

(0.62)

Reliable Cue

Ignore Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Random Cue
Likely Old Cue

1.19

(0.27)

1.36

(0.32)

Likely New Cue

1.13

(0.24)

1.33

(0.34)

Likely Old Cue

1.16

(0.27)

1.43

(0.47)

Likely New Cue

1.20

(0.28)

1.32

(0.34)

Reliable Cue

Hits
Overall Uncued/Baseline

	
  

1.46
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(0.38)

Correct Rejections
1.69

(0.46)

	
  
Hits
For hits, a 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of cue condition (random vs.
reliable) and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) was conducted. While neither the main effect
of cue condition or cue type was significant (ps>.43), the interaction between cue condition and
cue type was significant, F(1,30)=9.19, p=.004, ηp=.23 (see Figure 13 top right panel). Follow up
post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) revealed a marginal effect of random cues such that participants
responded slightly faster during Likely New relative to Likely Old cues (1.13 vs. 1.19, p=.09).
However, this effect was not significant for reliable cues (Likely Old 1.16 vs. Likely New 1.20,
p=.27). Note the interaction likely reached significance because participants responded
numerically slower for Likely New (invalid) vs. Likely Old (valid) cues for the reliable cue
condition, but this pattern was reversed for the random cue condition. Overall, however, hit
reaction time was largely unaffected by environmental cues during ignore instructions.
Correct Rejections
The 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of cue condition (random vs. reliable)
and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) revealed a significant main effect of cue type,
F(1,30)=7.00, p=.01, ηp=.18, with faster reaction times during Likely New relative to Likely Old
cues trials (1.32 vs. 1.39). The main effect of cue condition was not significant (p>.35). The
interaction between cue condition and cue type approached significance, F(1,30)=3.16, p=.09,
ηp=.10 (Figure 13, bottom left panel). While the interaction did not reach significance, post-hoc
tests revealed a significant influence of reliable cues (Likely Old 1.43 vs. Likely New 1.32,
p=.001), but not random cues (Likely New 1.33 vs. Likely Old 1.36, p=.35). Thus, consistent
with confidence analyses, there was some evidence that correct rejection reaction time was also
influenced by reliable cues during ignore instructions.
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Hits
Likely Old

3.0

Use Cues

Likely New

Ignore Cues

Reaction Time

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

Reliable

Random

Reliable

Random

Correct Rejections
Likely Old

3.0

Use Cues

Likely New

Ignore Cues

Reaction Time

ian reaction time under
2.5
nstructions for both
els depict correct
2.0

1.5

1.0

	
  

Reliable

Random

Reliable
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Working Memory. My final set of analyses examined whether participants’ ability to use or
ignore cues was linked to working memory. Once again, participants’ working memory was
estimated using a traditional absolute OSPAN score, which is the sum of all the perfectly
recalled sets (Unsworth et al., 2005) Table 14 shows the simple correlations between OSPAN
scores, shifts in response criterion, and baseline accuracy. When examining Table 14, it is clear
that OSPAN scores do not correlate significantly with criterion shifting in any condition. In order
to account for individual differences in uncued/baseline accuracy we also conducted hierarchical
regressions predicting shifts in response criterion (measured as the difference between criterion
measure (C) under Likely New vs. Likely Old cues) using baseline/uncued accuracy in Step 1 as
a covariate, and adding OSPAN scores in Step 2, separately for both use and ignore instructions.
Critically, during use instructions when adding OSPAN to the model it did not predict
increments in criterion shifts for random cues, ΔR2=0.01, F(1,28)=0.00, p=.99, nor reliable cues,
ΔR2=0.02, F(1,28)=0.60, p=.45. Furthermore, during ignore instructions OSPAN also did not
predict significant increments in criterion shifts for random cues, ΔR2=0.00, F(1,28)=0.16, p=.69,
nor reliable cues, ΔR2=0.00, F(1,28)=0.05, p=.82. The results suggest no relationship between
working memory as defined by this span task and participants’ shift in response criteria during
both use and ignore instructions, for both random and reliable cues.
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Table 14. Simple correlations between OSPAN Scores, baseline
accuracy, and criterion
swing (Experiment 3)
	
  

OSPAN

Baseline Use Random Use Reliable Ignore Random
Accuracy Cues Swing Cues Swing
Cues Swing

OSPAN
Baseline Accuracy

-0.19

Use Random Cues
Swing

0.02

-0.07

Use Reliable Cues
Swing

0.15

-0.11

0.14

Ignore Random Cues
Swing

-0.09

0.07

0.22

-0.22

Ignore Reliable Cues
Swing

-0.01

-0.18

-0.03

0.32

*** p<.001

	
  

** p<.01

* p<.05
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-0.09

	
  

4.3 Discussion
	
  

Experiment 3 examined whether participants could ignore random environmental cues.

Under an expectancy based account, random cues should be ignored since they no longer
engender the expectation of familiarity or novelty. Consistent with this prediction, the current
experiment revealed that when random and reliable cues were intermixed participants’ criteria
were not influenced by random cues regardless of whether they were instructed to generally use
or ignore cues within the blocks. Importantly, this is the first example to demonstrate a situation
where participants could completely eliminate the influence of environmental cues. However, in
contrast to previous experiments, the influence of the reliable cues during ignore instructions was
also considerably muted, which presumably had something to do with the fact they were
encountered intermixed with random cues. The initial analyses of criterion measures failed to
detect an effect of reliable cues during ignore instructions, but a more powerful mixed level
modeling of trial level response data, as well as the examination of correct rejection confidence
and reaction time data, suggested that reliable cues still exerted an influence. Regardless, it was
clearly the case the influence of reliable cues was much smaller than in previous experiments.
The finding that participants were able to more effectively ignore reliable cues when
intermixed with random cues was unexpected. However, it is currently unclear whether this
finding is due to intermixing random cues specifically, or whether this effect was due to
intermixing two levels of cue validity in general. Prior experiments where participants were
instructed to ignore cues always had a fixed cue validity of 75%, and perhaps it is important to
have a consistent mapping between the cue and recognition probe in order for an automatic
influence of cues to occur. Additionally, the use of multiple cue validities theoretically increases
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the number of decision criteria the subject must use during the session because a separate set of
confidence standards must be maintained for each cue validity. In fact, prior work using
confidence ratings scales has shown that when increasing the number of confidence criteria
needed to be maintained, recognition performance was lowered presumably due to the increased
criterion noise resulting from the burden of maintaining numerous criteria locations
simultaneously (Benjamin et al., 2013). Therefore, it could be the case that intermixing cue types
(i.e., the number of criterion needed to be maintained) could change the degree of cue influence.
Future work could directly assess this possibility by contrasting a group with 75% cue validity to
other groups in which in addition to the 75% condition, there would be other cue validities
present. Critically, across groups there would be a matched subset of yoked trials such that all
groups would encounter the same exact stimuli during 75% validly cued trials. By comparing the
yoked 75% validly cued trials across groups, one could assess how intermixing validities
influences 75% valid cues and also determine whether random cues specifically dampen the
influence of reliable cues or whether it is a more general phenomenon resulting from intermixing
two cue validities.
The current experiment also assessed whether individual differences in criterion shifting
were linked to working memory ability or subjective beliefs of cue validity. Once again no
relationship was found between working memory scores and criterion shifting during both use or
ignore cue instructions for reliable cues, and additionally there was also no relationship observed
with random cues. Furthermore, the degree of criterion shifting observed was also unrelated to
participants’ subjective assessment of cue validity for both use and ignore instructions. This
suggests the explicit beliefs regarding the level of cue validity may not be particularly important
in how participants rely on environmental cues. However, it is important to note that subjective
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assessments of cue validity were taken after all recognition testing was completed. Thus, it could
be the case that participants’ beliefs in cue validity changed as the experiment progressed and
collecting subjective ratings of cue influence ratings between each study/test cycle could perhaps
assess this change. Additionally, while a large number of participants reported not believing our
instructions regarding cue validity, another weakness of posttest questionnaires is that in some
cases prompting participants could cause them to reflect and only consider after the fact that they
did not find the cues to be the stated probabilities. While the current experiment suggests that
global beliefs about the validity of cues may not play a role in the degree of cue influence, based
on Experiment 3 it is clearly the case that participants can demonstrate awareness of the degree
of cue influence on trial by trial basis.
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Chapter 5
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 explored the effect of monetary motivation on the putatively automatic cue
influence. Experiments 1 and 2, as well as prior work, clearly demonstrated that participants can
dampen but not eliminate the influence of cues through simple instruction. However, one
potential argument as to why participants cannot fully ignore cues may be that they are not
sufficiently motivated to do so. While participants follow instructions to ignore cues to some
extent, demonstrated by the dampened criterion shift during ignore relative to use instructions, it
could be the case that providing additional incentive would motivate participants to fully ignore
cues. In the current experiment motivation to ignore cues was increased by providing participants
with a small monetary endowment from which they lost money when their responses were
influenced. If our prior results were simply due to a lack of motivation on the part of the
participant then criteria shifts should be much smaller or completely eliminated in the current
experiment.
	
  
5.1 Methods
Participants. Experiment 4 included 34 participants recruited from the Washington University
Experimetrix pool (average age=20.56, 22 females) who were given $10 per hour of
participation. All participants provided informed consent in accordance with the University’s
review board.
Materials and Procedure. The software and word list used were the same as in previous
experiments.
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Participants completed a total of 3 study/test cycles and were encouraged to take a brief
break between each study/test cycle. During study participants performed a syllable counting
task (i.e., does this word contain 1, 2, 3 or more syllables?) on a list of serially presented words
(100 items). Immediately after study, participants completed a recognition test where they
indicated whether the word presented was ‘old’ (previously studied) or ‘new’ (not previously
encountered in the experiment) (100 old items, 100 new items). The majority of test trials were
preceded by a 75% reliable cue reading Likely Old or Likely New that appeared 1 second prior
to the recognition probe (160 cued items-80 old, 80 new), while other trials were uncued or
baseline trials (40 uncued/baseline items-20 old, 20 new). Participants were explicitly informed
about the reliability of the cue using the same instructions as previous experiments. After each
recognition decision, participants made a confidence rating using a 6-point scale ranging from
50%-100% in 10% increments with 50% indicating guessing and 100% indicating certainty.
During the first test cycle participants were encouraged to use cues with the same
instructions as previous experiments and once again the words USE THE CUES remained on
screen during testing. During the second and third study test cycle participants were encouraged
to ignore the cues with the same instructions as previous experiments and the words IGNORE
THE CUES remained on screen during testing. Critically, to further encourage participants to
ignore cues they were given a monetary incentive using the following instructions:
“Prior research demonstrates that most people are not able to ignore cues, but some
people are able to do so. Your goal is to try as hard as you can to keep your responses
uncontaminated by the cue. In order to help motivate you to ignore the cues, we will pay
you $5.00 to completely ignore the cues and make your decision purely on your own
memory evidence. However, every time you are influenced by the cue and respond
differently than you would have relative to uncued trials, you will lose some of this
money. We will determine the amount of money you lose by calculating the percent
change in your responding on cued trials relative to uncued trials. For example, if your
responses change by 20% on cued trials relative to uncued trials, you will lose 20% of
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your $5.00 (i.e., $1.00), so you would only earn $4.00. This payment is in addition to the
one you will earn for your participation time.”
After the second test cycle participants were told their percentage of cue influence and
how much money they earned out of the $5.00. The percentage of money lost was calculated as
the difference between participants’ average ‘old’ rate ((hit rate + false alarm rate)/2) under
Likely Old minus Likely New cues. This percentage was then subtracted from $5.00. Cue
influence was measured using ‘old’ rates as opposed to criterion (C) in order to avoid hit and
false alarm rate corrections. Additionally, the absolute value of the difference in ‘old’ rates was
taken as opposed to the simple difference to avoid the potential of negative values.
During the third test cycle participants were once again instructed to ignore cues and
given another $5.00 endowment with the same instructions as the previous test cycle. At the end
of the third test cycle participants were again told their percentage of cue influence and how
much money they earned out of the $5.00. After this, participants were told the total additional
amount of money they earned through the experiment (up to $10.00), and were paid this amount
rounded up to the nearest whole dollar. Finally, to assess participants’ belief regarding cue
validity, at the end of recognition testing they were asked whether the cues were accurate
approximately 75% of the time using a Yes/No forced response. If participants responded ‘No’, a
follow up question asked them to indicate how accurate they thought the cue was using a
percentage.
	
  
5.2 Results and Discussion
Four participant’s data were excluded leaving 30 participants for analyses. One
participant was removed due to chance performance during baseline/uncued performance
(d’=0.04) suggesting that he/she was not engaged during the tasks. Another participant was
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removed due to a misinterpretation of ignore instructions and always responding opposite of the
cues during the second test cycle. Finally, 2 additional participants were removed because they
were discovered to be visually blocking the cue on screen using their hands during some portion
of trials in the ignore instruction condition. Once again while most results will be reported using
a conventional ANOVA approach, MLM will be used for additional targeted questions.

Criterion. See Table 15 for descriptive statistics for accuracy and criterion. Changes in criteria
were assessed with Signal Detection measure C using a 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with
factors of instruction (use vs. ignore) and cue type (Likely Old vs. Likely New). The main effect
of instruction was significant, F(1,29)=4.20, p=.05, ηp=.13, with participants responding more
liberally during use vs. ignore instructions (-0.02 vs. 0.07). Since prior experiments did not find a
main effect of instruction, it is likely the addition of the monetary incentive that caused
participants to respond more conservatively on cued trials during ignore instructions. The main
effect of cue type was significant, F(1,29)=81.70, p<.001, ηp=.74, with participants responding
more liberally under Likely Old vs. Likely New cues (-0.30 vs. 0.34). However, these main
effects were conditioned by a significant interaction between instruction and cue type,
F(1,29)=80.76, p<.001, ηp=.74. As expected, follow up post-hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) revealed a
significant difference between Likely Old vs. Likely New cues under use instructions (-0.59 vs.
0.55, p<.001). However, under ignore instructions the difference between Likely Old vs. Likely
New cues was not significant (0.01 vs. 0.13, p=.50). Thus, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2
where cues still exerted an influence during ignore instructions these results suggest that when
provided with a monetary incentive to ignore cues, decision criteria are not reliably affected by
environmental cues using a basic ANOVA on the summary criterion statistic.
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Since participants received feedback regarding how much money they lost after the first
ignore test cycle, the two ignore test cycles were assessed separately to examine whether
participants learned to more effectively disregard cues during the second ignore test cycle. The 2
X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of ignore test cycle (first vs. second) and cue type
(Likely Old vs. Likely New) revealed a marginal main effect of test cycle, F(1,29)=3.40, p=.08,
ηp=.10, with more conservative responding on the second test cycle relative to the first test cycle
(0.04 vs. 0.12). However, the interaction between test cycle and cue type was not significant,
F(1,29)=00, p=.99, ηp=.00, suggesting that the lack of shift between cue types was similar across
ignore test cycles.
Finally, changes in criterion were also assessed as a function of subjective ratings of cue
validity. Overall, 50% of participants (N=15) reported that the reliable cues were 75% accurate.
Those who reported not believing the reliable cues to be 75% accurate tended to estimate a lower
percentage (M=53%, SD=9.39). To examine whether criterion shifting was related to subjective
reports of cue validity, a simple correlation was conducted between criterion swing scores
(Likely New C- Likely Old C) and subjective percentages of cue validity, with the actual
percentages of cue validity (i.e., 75%) used for those participants who provided a ‘yes’ response.
However, this correlation was not significant for either use (r=-.12, p=.54) or ignore (r=-.03,
p=.88) instructions. Similar to the previous experiment, these results suggest that subjective
estimates of cue validity did not affect the degree of criterion shifting.
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Table 15. Average response rates, accuracy, and criterion with standard deviations in
	
  
parenthesis (Experiment 4)
	
  

Use Instructions
HR

CR

d'

C

Uncued/Baseline

0.80

(0.12)

0.75

(0.17)

1.69

(0.69)

-0.07

(0.39)

Cued

0.82

(0.06)

0.81

(0.09)

1.86

(0.45)

0.00

(0.23)

Likely Old Cue

0.90

(0.07)

0.54

(0.22)

1.52

(0.61)

-0.60

(0.50)

Likely New Cue

0.59

(0.14)

0.89

(0.08)

1.60

(0.58)

0.55

(0.29)

Ignore Instructions
HR

CR

d'

C

Uncued/Baseline

0.78

(0.14)

0.73

(0.14)

1.57

(0.76)

-0.09

(0.37)

Cued

0.73

(0.10)

0.76

(0.13)

1.46

(0.61)

0.08

(0.31)

Likely Old Cue

0.74

(0.11)

0.73

(0.14)

1.39

(0.64)

0.01

(0.30)

Likely New Cue

0.71

(0.13)

0.77

(0.14)

1.45

(0.65)

0.13

(0.38)
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Mixed level modeling. While the ANOVA examining criteria did not detect a reliable shift in
criterion during ignore instructions, numerically the effect was in the expected direction. Once
again, since the standard ANOVA model does not allow one to simultaneously model variation
in overall bias and differences in recognition accuracy across subjects, mixed level modeling was
used to try to improve the power to detect effects for cues under the ignore instruction condition.
Analysis was restricted to ignore test cycles since during use test cycles the anticipated effect of
cues was observed using an ANOVA approach and no monetary manipulation was included.
Using MLM response (1-old vs. 0-new) was predicted using cue type (1-Likely Old vs. 0-Likely
New) and item status (1-old vs.0-new) at the trial level for each participant under ignore
instructions. As in Experiment 3, a random intercept and slope component was included such
that the subjects' intercepts and slopes of items status were allowed to vary, capturing subject
differences in bias and accuracy. Once again linear probability models were used. Initially the
full model was fit including both main effects and the two-way interaction and again the final
model was determined by systematically removing predictors starting with the highest order
interaction until there was a significant decrease in fit using chi-squared tests of log-likelihoods.
Coefficient estimates were tested using the Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of freedom.
The full model included both main effects and interaction between item status and cue
type. Removing the interaction between item status and cue type did not significantly reduce fit,
𝜒2(1)=0.02, p=.89. However, removing the main effect of cue type did significantly reduce fit,
𝜒2(1)=12.66, p<.001. Thus, the final model (See Table 16) included a significant main effect of
item status, b=0.48 t(31)=17.06, p<.001, which simply reflected accuracy and indicated that
participants were more likely respond ‘old’ when the item was old vs. new. Critically, the main
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effect of cue type was also significant, b=0.04 t(9537)=3.56, p<.001, indicating that participants
responded ‘old’ more often under Likely Old vs. Likely New cues. Thus, the MLM suggests that
cues exerted an influence during ignore instruction, although again this effect was dampened
relative to the earlier experiments and pilot work and the model suggests only a 4% shift in
response probabilities in response to the cues.
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Table 16. Mixed level model for ignore instructions (Experiment 4)
	
  
	
  

Ignore Instructions
Random Effects:
Groups-Subjects

Variance

St. Dev.

Correlation

(Intercept)

0.01

0.12

Item Status

0.02

0.14

-0.76

Estimate

Std. Error

df

(Intercept)

1.23

0.02

30

53.09 <.001***

Item Status

0.48

0.03

31

17.06 <.001***

Cue Type

0.04

0.01

9537

Fixed Effects:

*** p<.001

	
  

** p<.01

* p<.05
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t

3.56

p-value

<.001***

	
  
Confidence. As in the previous experiment, confidence reports were analyzed in order to assess
whether the influence of cues during ignore instructions would perhaps be present using this
more finely grained measure. All confidence analyses focused on correct responses (i.e., hits and
correct rejections) since incorrect responses were relatively infrequent and provide much less
reliable estimates. The main analyses only focused on ignore test cycles, but Table 17 contains
descriptive statistics for confidence under both use and ignore instructions. Additionally, ignore
test cycle (first vs. second) did not interact with cue type for any of the analyses so only the
simple t-tests comparing Likely Old vs. Likely New cues are reported. For hits, there was a
significant effect of cue type such that confidence was higher under Likely Old vs. Likely New
cues, t(29)=3.36, p=.001(88.78 vs. 87.03). For correct rejections, there was also a significant
effect of cue type with higher confidence under Likely New vs. Likely Old cues, t(29)=3.25,
p=.002 (81.97 vs. 79.22). Critically, these results suggest that participants were not able to fully
eliminate the influence of cues from their subjective confidence assessments.
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Table 17. Average confidence with standard deviations in parenthesis
(Experiment 4)
	
  
	
  

Use Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Uncued/Baseline

86.4

(9.35)

77.45

(10.09)

Likely Old Cue

86.73

(7.51)

73.62

(12.33)

Likely New Cue

85.04

(8.55)

82.15

(9.90)

Ignore Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Uncued/Baseline

88.73

(9.70)

82.57

(11.08)

Likely Old Cue

88.78

(9.16)

79.22

(12.93)

Likely New Cue

87.03

(10.06)

81.97

(10.98)
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Reaction Time. Finally, reaction time was also assessed in order to determine whether the
influence of cues during ignore instructions would be present. Subject medians, as opposed to
means, were used for estimating reaction time since response time distributions are positively
skewed and the median is less influenced by outliers. Once again, the main analyses only
focused on ignore test cycles, but Table 18 contains descriptive statistics for reaction under both
use and ignore instructions. Additionally, ignore test cycle (first vs. second) did not interact with
cue type for any of the analyses so only the simple t-tests comparing Likely Old vs. Likely New
cues are reported. For hits, there was a significant effect of cue type such that reaction time was
faster under Likely Old vs. Likely New cues, t(29)=3.58, p=.001 (1.19 vs. 1.42). For correct
rejections, there was also a significant effect of cue type with faster reaction under Likely New
vs. Likely Old cues, t(29)=3.04, p=.005 (1.43 vs. 1.58). Analogous to the confidence analyses,
the reaction time analyses also suggest that participants were not able to fully eliminate the
influence of cues.
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Table 18. Average median reaction time in seconds with standard deviations in
	
  
parenthesis (Experiment 4)
	
  

Hits

Correct Rejections

Uncued/Baseline

1.62

(0.50)

1.99

(0.78)

Likely Old Cue

1.49

(0.42)

2.17

(0.96)

Likely New Cue

2.08

(0.93)

1.54

(0.37)

Ignore Instructions
Hits

Correct Rejections

Uncued/Baseline

1.33

(0.45)

1.55

(0.47)

Likely Old Cue

1.19

(0.33)

1.58

(0.56)

Likely New Cue

1.42

(0.61)

1.43

(0.46)
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5.3 Discussion
Experiment 4 examined whether participants could ignore reliable environmental cues
when provided with a monetary incentive to do so. A simple explanation for the prior results
demonstrating that participants could not fully ignore cues could be that participants were not
sufficiently motivated to follow the task instructions. However, it is important to note that
participants never completely failed to follow task instructions in prior work since criterion shifts
were always found to be smaller during ignore relative to use instructions suggesting that
participants were in fact attempting to ignore cues. Additionally, there is also reason to believe
that subjects are generally responsive to task instructions during memory research. For example,
work by Wallace (Wallace, 1982; Wallace, Sawyer, & Robertson, 1978) and Cox and Dobbins
(2011) has examined subject recognition across standard lists, in which old and new items were
intermixed, and pure lists in which all of the tested materials were studied. When subjects were
informed of this pure list manipulation, their hit rates and confidence assessments were
nonetheless highly similar to that of the standard intermixed condition (Cox & Dobbins, 2011).
Thus, participants are capable of not attempting to capitalize on situations that could inflate
accuracy when asked to do so.
The current experiment increased motivation by providing participants with a small
monetary endowment from which they would lose money if they did not fully ignore
environmental cues. Critically, results revealed that decision criteria measures did not shift
reliably between Likely Old vs. Likely New cues during ignore instructions. However, when
using mixed level modeling and assessing confidence and reaction time data a reliable effect of
cue type was found, suggesting that the influence of cues was again not fully eliminated.
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Nevertheless, it is clearly the case the influence of cues was greatly dampened relative to
Experiments 1 and 2. Additionally, replicating Experiment 3 once again it appears as though
subjective ratings of cue validity were not linked to the degree of criterion shifting during either
use or ignore instructions.
Providing monetary incentive to ignore cues largely dampened the influence of cues,
although the effect was not fully eliminated. However, one important factor to consider in the
current study is that participants were not forced to read the environmental cue when it appeared
on screen. Therefore, it could be the case that the monetary incentive did not diminish the
influence of cues on decision making per se, but instead it motivated participants to adopt
various strategies that could help them avoid reading the cue (e.g., looking at different portion of
the screen). In fact some informal evidence suggest this may have been the case. Two
participants were removed from the analyses since they tried to prevent themselves from reading
the cue by covering a portion of the screen using their hands; a behavior not noticed during
earlier studies. This suggests that participants may have realized the cues were difficult to ignore
after reading them and it is possible that other participants may have also adopted less extreme
but similar strategies to try and prevent themselves from reading the cues. Follow-up work could
control for this confound by including catch trials similar to Experiment 1 where following
old/new and confidence judgments some portion of the trials would prompt participants to
indicate the status of the cue, Likely Old or Likely New, for that trial. Additionally, to further
encourage participants to read the cue a negative consequence such as a long time out period
could occur every time participants were incorrect or took a long period of time to respond
during these cue catch trials.
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Chapter 6
General Discussion
While recognition criterion regulation is often thought to be a largely controlled or
intentional process (see Introduction), the current set of experiments used an Explicit Memory
Cueing paradigm to assess the potential for an automatic or involuntary influence of
environmental cues during recognition judgment. Pilot data demonstrated that when participants
were instructed to ignore reliable environmental cues (i.e., Likely Old or Likely New) during
recognition judgments, they were able to dampen their influence relative to when they were
instructed to use these cues. Critically, however, they were not able to fully eliminate the
influence of cues as demonstrated by a large and significant swing in decision criteria between
Likely Old vs. Likely New cues. These results suggested that perhaps criterion regulation is not
entirely under observer control and participants may have difficulties separating internal memory
evidence from environmental information.
One hypothesis by which this automatic influence of cues may occur is what I termed the
expectancy account of cue influence. Under this account, cues engender an expectation such that
Likely New cues elicit an expectation of novelty while Likely Old cues elicit an expectation of
familiarity. This cue driven expectancy may then contaminate the processing of the memory
signal, such that items following a Likely Old cue are more likely to be processed as old,
whereas items following a Likely New cue are more likely to be processed as new. The notion
that expectancy can drive or distort the interpretation of memory signals is somewhat similar to
literature examining fluency or misattribution effects, where fluency (i.e. ease of processing) is
misattributed as familiarity or some other characteristic relevant to a current judgment (e.g.
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Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Whittlesea, 1993; Whittlesea, Jacoby, &
Girard, 1990). For example, in a basic fluency task participants are more likely to falsely
recognize an item (e.g., melon) as studied when it is preceded by an identical context prime (e.g.,
‘melon’) relative to an unrelated prime (e.g., ‘xoxoxoxo’) (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989).
However, during this paradigm the prime drives perceptual fluency such that it facilitates the
identification of the probes presumably at the lexical level (i.e., ease of perceptual processing),
which is then misattributed to feelings of familiarity. In contrast, in the explicit cueing paradigm
the cues likely drive memory-processing fluency (i.e., oldness or newness), which is then
inappropriately (since participants are supposed to be ignoring cues) attributed to familiarity or
novelty.
The current experiments assessed the expectancy hypothesis in light of the following
questions: (1) Could the influence of cues be eliminated if the cues no longer served a
preparatory role and were instead presented after the recognition probe? (2) Could observers
demonstrate any awareness of the automatic influence of cues? (3) Could observers eliminate the
influence of cues that are no longer predictive (i.e., random cues), and finally (4) could increased
motivation through monetary incentives eliminate the automatic influence of cues?
The expectancy hypothesis was partially supported in the current set of experiments. In
Experiment 1, cues still exerted a large effect when they occurred after the recognition probe and
this effect did not diminish across cue lags when measured by mean shifts in criteria. While this
finding is inconsistent with an expectancy account, partial support was found for the expectancy
hypothesis when assessing confidence and confidence reaction time during which the effect of
cues decreased as the probe to cue lag became longer. However, as outlined in the Experiment 1
discussion, it could be the case that participants did not fully commit to a decision before the cue
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appeared allowing cues to still exert a fairly robust influence even at long lags. Regardless,
overall Experiment 1 demonstrated that the automatic influence of cues occurred even if a cue
appeared after the recognition probe. Furthermore, Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants
had some awareness of the automatic influence of cues such that participants were able to
accurately assess trials during which cues exerted a greater influence. In Experiment 3,
participants were able to ignore random cues intermixed with reliable cues, supporting the
expectancy hypothesis which predicts that uninformative cues should not exert an influence
because they are no longer reliable indicators of expectations; however, the influence of reliable
cues was also considerably dampened (relative to Experiments 1 and 2) in this condition and
only present when using more powerful analyses, such as mixed level modeling, or potentially
more sensitive measures, such as confidence and reaction time. In Experiment 4, when
participants were motivated through monetary incentives to ignore cues, the influence of cues
was not present when measured by shifts in decision criteria but again it was present using mixed
level modeling of responses and during confidence and reaction time analyses.
Overall, the findings demonstrate that in no case were subjects able to fully eliminate the
effect of reliable environmental cues they were instructed to ignore. Indeed, the only condition
during which the influence of cues was fully eliminated was in Experiment 3 when participants
were provided with random cues. While the influence of reliable cues was greatly dampened in
Experiments 3 and 4 such that significant mean level shifts in the signal detection criterion
measure were not observed, more powerful analyses and more sensitive and introspective
measures demonstrated a reliable influence of cues during ignore instructions. The fact that
cueing effects were often more robust in correct rejections confidence as opposed to hits is not
necessarily surprising given prior work examining the influence of cues under a dual process
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framework (Jaeger, Cox, & Dobbins, 2012a). In Jaeger, Cox, and Dobbins (2012) the authors
concluded that cues were more likely to affect familiarity as opposed to recollective processes
and, because of the high confidence associated with recollected hits, the effect of cues on hit
confidence were largely eliminated. Furthermore, the finding that the effects of cueing were
sometimes observed in reports of confidence as opposed to summary accuracy or criterion
measures is consistent with other work which suggests that introspective (i.e., metacognitive)
measures are sometimes more sensitive to context effects than measures of recognition
(Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, & Coote, 2014). However, further research will need to be
conducted to rule out the possibility that these dampened effects of cues were not simply due to
participants avoiding reading the cues and subsequent designs should uniformly use catch trials
and penalties to help force participants to fully process the cues and maintain their status in
working memory while assessing memoranda. Should such designs converge with the current
findings it will suggest that environmental cues are particularly pernicious in their influence and
that they fundamentally alter the way memoranda are processed despite observers’ intentions
otherwise.
The finding that participants were able to track gradations of cue influence during ignore
instructions suggests that they had some level of awareness regarding the automatic influence of
cues and they could perhaps be using strategies that try to offset this influence. Somewhat similar
to the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), one hypothesis
regarding the nature of this influence could be that cues automatically anchor participants
towards a particular response or judgment. The iconic example of the anchoring heuristic in
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described a study where participants were asked whether the
percentage of African countries in the United Nations was more or less than a random number
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between 0-100 that was determined by a spinning wheel. After this initial judgment, participants
were asked to indicate their specific percentage estimate by moving their answer up or down
from this initial starting point. Results revealed that the initial starting point had a large impact
on final estimates, with the initial starting points of 10% and 65% yielding median estimates of
25% and 45%. Thus, these types of anchoring effects demonstrates that observers’ initial starting
point can highly influence their judgment on a particular task and this occurs even when
participants were made aware of anchoring effect or when they were incentivized to ignore the
anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). It is also
important to note that these anchoring effects occur despite the anchors being completely
uninformative (Chapman & Johnson, 2002).
Given this pervasive influence of anchors (see Furnham & Boo, 2011 for a review) it may
not be particularly surprising that environmental cues that are reliable could perhaps anchor
participants towards a particular response. When instructed to use cues, participants may
evaluate the strength of their memory evidence and adjust their decision criteria accordingly.
Under this characterization, when instructed to ignore cues, participants’ attempts to overcome
the anchoring effect would somehow be inefficient and lead to biased responding. For example,
participants could underestimate their initial degree of cue influence, presumably because they
may not be able to fully separate internal memory evidence from environmental cues, and
therefore they may not apply the appropriate adjustment. The finding that cues exert an influence
even when presented at long lags after the recognition probe may be somewhat problematic for
the hypothesis that cues may serve as anchors; however, if we assume that participants did not
fully commit to their decision during the long cue lag period, then the cues could still potentially
result in these anchoring type effects. Furthermore, if one assumes that the ability to adjust away
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from environmental cues may require some form of cognitive control then speeding participants
during their recognition judgments may even further prevent participants from appropriately
adjusting. Future work could assess this question by varying response deadlines during
recognition judgments, with the prediction that shorter response deadlines may result in the
largest cueing effects under ignore instructions since participants do not have sufficient time to
recruit the controlled processes needed for adjustment.
Importantly, the ability to overcome an effect of anchoring would likely require that
participants are aware that anchoring effects occurred. In the case of environmental cues,
Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants were perhaps aware of the influence of cues;
however, they were clearly not able to able to eliminate their influence despite this awareness.
While research in the judgment and decision making literature is somewhat mixed on whether
warnings can decreases anchoring effects (Chapman & Johnson, 2002), there is some evidence to
suggest that forewarning participants does not decrease the size of the anchoring effect (Wilson
et al., 1996), particularly for experimentally provided anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2005). This is
consistent with the notion that the automatic influence of environmental cues may be difficult to
eliminate despite awareness. Nevertheless, if observers are aware of the influence of cues there
could be situations during which they could overly adjust in order overcome this unwanted
influence. This type of over adjustment could result in a contrarian stance such that participants
start responding opposite of the cues (e.g., more liberally under Likely New as opposed to Likely
Old cues).
In the current experiments, there was some evidence that a proportion of participants
started to adopt a contrarian stance, specifically during Experiment 4 during which participants
were given a monetary incentive to ignore cues. When calculating criterion shifts scores (Likely
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New C minus Likely Old C) those participants who respond in accordance with the cue would
have positive values, while those participants who take a contrarian stance and respond opposite
of the cues would have negative values. Generally, most participants’ criteria shifts were in the
direction of the cues during ignore instructions, and this was particularly true for Experiments 1
and 2 where reliable shifts in response criterion were observed. Specifically, in Experiment 1 the
number of participant who had had negative criterion shift scores was 14.8% (N=4) for short cue
lag, 11.1% (N=3) for medium cue lag, and 18.5% (N=5) for long cue lag. In Experiment 2, not a
single participant had a negative shift score. In contrast, for Experiments 3 and 4 where no mean
level criterion shifts were observed, a much greater number of participants had negative shift
scores. In Experiment 3, 32% of participants (N=10) had negative shift scores for reliable cues
under ignore instructions and for Experiment 4 it was 47% (N=14). Thus, it could be that case
that one of the reasons mean level criterion shifts during these experiments failed to be detected
was because a larger proportion of participants attempted to limit criterion influences by counterresponding to the cues on some trials. Nonetheless, average effects were demonstrated via MLM
and inspection of confidence and reaction time. Particularly in the case of Experiment 4 where
participants were given large incentives to ignore cues, they may be more likely to
overcompensate using some type of contrarian strategy. However, this idea is speculative at this
point since an increased number of negative shift scores would also occur simply due to noise
around the ideal shift score of zero if participants fully ignored cues.
A secondary question examined in Experiments 2 and 3 was whether working memory was
linked to criterion shifting during either use or ignore instructions. Neither experiment found a
relationship between criterion shifts and performance on the operation span task. However, the
sample size in each individual experiment was relatively small and the analyses could potentially
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be underpowered to detect small effects. In order to increase power, I also conducted a
hierarchical regression combining data from both experiments, using only data from reliably
cued trials in Experiment 3. After controlling for uncued/baseline performance and experiment,
adding OSPAN to the model did not predict increments in criterion shifts for use, ΔR2=0.03,
F(1,51)=2.19, p=.15, or ignore instructions, ΔR2=0.00, F(1,51)=0.50, p=.49. Additionally,
OSPAN was also not significant when predicting shifts in criterion during ignore instructions
after controlling for experiment and shifts in criterion under use instructions, ΔR2=0.00,
F(1,50)=0.02, p=.88. While not reported, OSPAN was also not significantly linked with several
other measures of cue influence including changes in reaction time and confidence, ps>.14.
Furthermore, recent work from the laboratory has also failed to detect a relationship between
working memory and criterion shifting in both younger and older adults (Konkel, Selmeczy, &
Dobbins, 2014). Thus, it appears as though there may be some evidence that cognitive control
mechanisms tapped by complex span tasks are unrelated to criteria regulation. However, the
range of span scores may be relatively limited in the current population (M=52.76, SD=14.10,
Range=15-75), and therefore the failure to detect a relationship with working memory could be
due to this restricted range. Additionally, while working memory is thought to be reflect
maintenance and manipulation of information, particularly when control is needed to override
automatic response tendencies (Engle & Kane, 2004; Unsworth & Engle, 2007), other research
in executive functioning treats various factors such as shifting, updating, and inhibition as
potentially separable factors that contribute to controlled processes (Miyake et al., 2000). Thus, it
could be the case that a relationship may be observed with criterion regulation when using a
different measure that may tap different aspects of cognitive control. For example, if ignoring
cues requires inhibiting a prepotent cue driven response, then measures of response inhibition
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(e.g., go-nogo tasks) may better correlate with shifts in criteria. Regardless, future work is
needed to more thoroughly address the link between criterion regulation and cognitive control
using several measures of control and a larger, more diverse sample.
Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 also demonstrated that subjective beliefs regarding cue
validity were not associated with the degree of criterion shifting that occurred either during use
or ignore instructions. This again serves to demonstrate the cueing effects were robust and even
participants who did not believe the instructions regarding cue validity still displayed cueing
effects. However, the current experiments only prompted participants to indicate their belief in
cue validity after all recognition testing was completed and thus it is possible that these reports
do not map closely onto those that were present and perhaps fluctuating during the course of
actual testing. Additionally, asking all participants to report a percentage estimate of cue validity,
as opposed to only those participants that gave a ‘No’ response, may provide a better measure
with more variability to detect a relationship between beliefs in cue validity and degree of
criterion shifting.

6.1 Conclusions
The current experiments demonstrated a pernicious influence of reliable environmental
cues. While the influence of cues was dampened during certain manipulations, across four
experiments participants were never able to fully eliminate the influence of reliable
environmental cues with cueing effects present in either overall criterion estimates, mixed level
linear probability model betas, mean confidence, and/or median reaction time. This demonstrates
a novel finding that automatic or unintentional non-memory cue driven processes can influence
recognition decision processes. Furthermore, despite evidence that participants seem aware of
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that unintentional influences may be occurring, their responses were still contaminated. Thus,
observers were unable to fully separate internal memory evidence from environmental
information, even in a simple laboratory based task where explicit instructions were provided to
ignore environmental cues. In real world situations recognition judgments may often be made in
the context of several environmental cues, yet we probably feel as though we have complete
control over our decision and we can limit their influence if we wish to do so. For example, when
a spouse indicates that the movie you consider renting is one you have likely seen before, your
decision about whether the movie is familiar or novel may be influenced such that your original
memory signal cannot be fully separated from your spouse’s recommendation. Critically,
unwanted cue driven expectancies on observers’ memory signal are particularly problematic for
situations where one’s goal is to keep memories uncontaminated by environmental information
(e.g., eyewitness testimony) or situations during which a source of information may suddenly
become unreliable and must now be ignored. The current data demonstrate that even if we are
aware that our recognition may have been involuntarily influenced, we lack the ability to fully
negate or offset the influence.
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